Abraham Accords: A fractured regional landscape reshapes the future of diplomatic efforts.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020, represent a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Initiated under the Trump administration, they saw Israel normalise relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, in exchange for a suspension of Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank and, in the case of Morocco, US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara. These agreements bypassed the traditional Palestinian-first approach to regional peace, focusing instead on shared strategic interests, particularly security concerns regarding Iran. While Sudan’s progress towards full implementation remains stalled following the 2021 coup, the UAE and Bahrain have expanded trade, tourism, and security cooperation with Israel. Morocco and Israel have likewise strengthened ties, though tensions remain regarding the Palestinian issue. The overarching aim was to build a broader network of cooperation and stability within the region, but the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023 has profoundly impacted these prospects.
Progress Made: Building on Existing Foundations
Despite the war, momentum towards further normalisation hasn’t entirely evaporated. Saudi Arabia, though holding off on formalising an agreement already ‘in principle’ reached in 2023, continues to engage in behind-the-scenes discussions facilitated by the United States. Discussions revolved around a comprehensive package – including a security guarantee from the US for Saudi Arabia, US assistance with a civilian nuclear programme, and crucially, significant concessions to the Palestinians. Prior to October, the expectation was that a deal could be announced in early 2024.
Beyond Saudi Arabia, Oman has subtly warmed its relationship with Israel, allowing Israeli airlines to utilise its airspace and hosting Israeli officials. While not formal normalisation, it represents a notable shift. Other Arab states, including Qatar, have maintained quiet back channels with Israel, driven by issues like hostage negotiations during the current conflict. Trade between Israel and existing partners within the Accords has continued, albeit under fluctuating pressures; the UAE, in particular, has maintained a significant level of economic engagement. Initiatives promoting people-to-people ties, like cultural exchanges and increased tourism, were experiencing growth before the war and face an uncertain future, though not complete standstill. The focus has shifted from public displays of cooperation to more discreet, pragmatic security-related collaboration.
Challenges: War, Public Opinion and Palestinian Concerns
The Israel-Hamas war has introduced formidable obstacles to further normalisation. The scale of devastation in Gaza and the rising Palestinian death toll have ignited widespread public outrage across the Arab world, making it politically perilous for leaders to be seen as accommodating Israel. Public opinion polls consistently demonstrate strongly negative sentiment towards Israel within most Arab nations, and governments are acutely aware of this.
Even Saudi Arabia, perceived as the most likely next signatory, faces domestic constraints. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership relies on maintaining support from conservative elements within the kingdom, a segment that is highly critical of Israeli policies towards Palestinians. The initial understanding – that progress on a normalisation deal was contingent on significant steps towards a two-state solution – appears increasingly unattainable in the current climate. The Palestinian Authority feels sidelined by the Accords, and its weakened position further complicates Saudi Arabia’s calculus.
Furthermore, the war has resurrected deep-seated distrust between regional actors. The heightened tensions have seen an uptick in proxy conflicts, particularly involving Iran-backed groups, raising the risk of escalation. The United States’ perceived unwavering support for Israel has also fuelled resentment among some Arab states, weakening its mediating role. The breadth of the challenges suggests that resuming formal negotiations, even if desired by all parties, will be a complex and protracted process.
Israel-Iran Dimension: A Key Driver
The Abraham Accords were, in part, a response to shared anxieties regarding Iran’s growing regional influence. The normalisation of relations with Arab states was seen as a way to build a united front against Iran and its proxies. This dynamic remains central. The current conflict has exacerbated those anxieties. Iran’s support for Hamas and other militant groups has confirmed the fears of many Arab states.
However, the war also risks accelerating Iran’s nuclear programme and further destabilising the region. A more assertive Iran could create a new security dilemma, prompting further arms races and proxy conflicts. For Saudi Arabia, balancing its desire for a security guarantee from the US (which would necessitate closer ties with Israel) against the need to manage its relationship with Iran is a delicate balancing act. Normalisation with Israel is viewed by Saudi Arabia, in part, as a hedge against the potential for a more militarised Iran, but the scale of the current conflict has heightened the risks associated with alienating Tehran. The focus has shifted from proactively challenging Iran to containing its influence—a task best achieved through regional cooperation, a goal complicated by existing fissures and the war.
Path Forward: Incremental Steps and Regional Realignments
A comprehensive, grand bargain involving Saudi Arabia and a reinvigorated peace process with the Palestinians seems unlikely in the immediate future. The road ahead will likely be characterised by incremental steps and a focus on managing existing tensions.
The priority for the US will be to de-escalate the conflict in Gaza and prevent regional spillover. Once a ceasefire is secured, the focus can shift to addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, including the Palestinian grievances. Parallel efforts to rebuild trust between Saudi Arabia and Israel will be crucial, likely conducted through discreet diplomatic channels.
Saudi Arabia, rather than formally signing a normalisation agreement, might pursue limited security cooperation with Israel, focusing on intelligence sharing and joint efforts to counter Iranian influence. Smaller-scale agreements with other Arab states, building on the existing framework of the Accords, are more probable. The success of this approach will depend on whether regional leaders can prioritise shared strategic interests over domestic political considerations and public opinion. Ultimately, a sustainable path towards broader normalisation hinges on addressing the Palestinian question – a task that appears increasingly daunting, but remains essential for long-term regional stability.
Source Attribution: Analysis based on expert commentary, regional reporting, and discussions with diplomatic sources familiar with the Abraham Accords process and Saudi-Israeli relations – gathered throughout January and February 2024. Specific individual sources are withheld to protect confidentiality.