Abraham Accords: A Framework for Regional Diplomacy, Faces New Tests
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020 under the Trump administration, represent a series of historic agreements under which Israel normalised diplomatic relations with several Arab nations – initially the UAE and Bahrain, followed by Sudan and Morocco. These agreements moved beyond decades of largely symbolic non-belligerence, establishing economic, security, and cultural ties. While heralded as a potential turning point in the region, paving the way for broader peace, the Accords were always a complex undertaking, built on shifting geopolitical sands and dependent on particular leadership priorities. Today, the framework remains largely intact, but progress towards broader normalisation – particularly with Saudi Arabia – has become significantly more fraught following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. The overarching goal had been to build a more integrated and stable Middle East, but the current conflict has dramatically raised the stakes and altered the calculations of key regional players.
Progress Made Towards Saudi Normalisation Before October 7th
Prior to the recent escalation, Saudi Arabia and Israel were reportedly making substantial, though discreet, progress towards a normalisation agreement. US-led mediation throughout 2023 was focused on crafting a deal that addressed the key priorities for both Riyadh and Jerusalem. Several media reports indicated a potential framework was emerging that involved significant US security guarantees for Saudi Arabia, assistance with its civilian nuclear programme (with stringent safeguards), and crucially, concessions to the Palestinians.
These concessions for the Palestinians remained a core demand from Riyadh, with indications that these would include a renewed push for a two-state solution, a freeze on settlement expansion, and potentially the release of long-held Palestinian prisoners. Source material suggests that Israelis were prepared to offer some significant concessions – more substantive than previously offered – in order to secure a landmark deal with the Kingdom.
Economically, the potential benefits of normalisation were substantial. Investment opportunities were being explored in areas such as technology, renewable energy, and tourism. The opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli flights, already implemented, pointed to the wider commercial possibilities. Beyond bilateral ties, the prospect of Saudi normalisation was also seen as a catalyst for other Arab nations to potentially follow suit, further expanding the circle of peace. The initial momentum, fostered by shared concerns over Iran, appeared strong, despite existing reservations within Saudi Arabia’s conservative establishment.
Challenges Mounting After the Gaza Offensive
The October 7th Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent military response in Gaza fundamentally altered this trajectory. The scale of the destruction and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza prompted widespread condemnation across the Arab world, making it politically far more difficult for Saudi Arabia to justify normalising relations with Israel whilst Palestinians were suffering. Public opinion within Saudi Arabia, historically sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, is overwhelmingly critical of Israel’s actions.
Saudi officials have repeatedly stressed that any normalisation deal is contingent on a credible and irreversible path towards a Palestinian state. The current Israeli government’s stance – and particularly the rhetoric of some hard-line ministers – has fuelled doubts about its commitment to a two-state solution. Furthermore, Riyadh has publicly criticised Israel’s conduct during the war, accusing it of collective punishment of Palestinian civilians.
Beyond the Palestinian issue, the war has exacerbated regional tensions. The increased activity by Houthi rebels in Yemen, who are aligned with Iran and have targeted Israeli and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, adds another layer of complexity. Saudi Arabia, while seeking to de-escalate the situation, cannot ignore the strategic implications of a more volatile Red Sea. Moreover, obtaining convincing US security guarantees now feels more uncertain for the Saudis, given domestic political pressures in Washington and questions surrounding the reliability of US commitment. The war’s impact on global oil markets also introduces economic uncertainties.
The Israel-Iran Dimension & Regional Security
The Merlows focus on normalisation is inextricably linked to the broader regional security dynamic, where the relationship between Israel and Iran plays a pivotal role. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel share a concern about Iran’s growing influence in the region and its support for proxy groups. This shared interest was a significant, though unacknowledged, driver of the pre-war normalisation talks.
However, the current conflict risks further escalating tensions between Israel and Iran. Hezbollah’s increased activity on Israel’s northern border, supported by Iran, raises the spectre of a wider regional war. A heightened conflict between Israel and Iran could completely derail the normalisation process, pushing Saudi Arabia further into a defensive posture.
The Saudis are likely weighing the potential benefits of a security alliance with Israel against the risks of being perceived as complicit in the ongoing conflict, or being drawn into a wider confrontation with Iran. While the desire to counter Iranian hegemony remains, the optics of normalising relations with Israel during a humanitarian crisis in Gaza are particularly damaging for Riyadh. The war has also, ironically, given Iran a degree of leverage, allowing it to position itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause and strengthen its ties with other regional actors.
A Fragile Path Forward – Realistically
The path to Saudi-Israeli normalisation is now significantly more challenging and uncertain. It is improbable that a comprehensive deal will be reached in the immediate aftermath of the current conflict. However, complete abandonment of the process is not inevitable.
A possible scenario involves a phased approach. First, a ceasefire in Gaza, coupled with the release of hostages and a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation, is essential. Second, a credible resurgence of the peace process, guided by international mediators and with meaningful engagement from all parties, is needed. This would require concessions from both Israel and the Palestinians – and strong backing from Saudi Arabia.
A smaller-scale, interim agreement focusing on economic cooperation and security coordination, rather than full diplomatic recognition, could also be explored as a confidence-building measure. The US role will be crucial. A renewed commitment to regional security guarantees for Saudi Arabia, along with sustained diplomatic pressure on Israel to address Palestinian concerns, will be essential. However, success hinges on a significant shift in the political landscape and a willingness from all parties to compromise – something currently lacking amidst the heightened emotions and entrenched positions.
Source: This report is based on analysis of publicly available information from international news agencies (Reuters, Associated Press, BBC News, The New York Times), specialist Middle East policy briefings (Middle East Institute, Chatham House), and informed commentary from regional experts. The underlying premise is built upon the reports focusing on the Saudi Arabian position pre- and post- October 7th attacks. Local sources within Saudi Arabia and Israel willing to comment on the record are currently limited and access is restricted.