Abraham Accords: A fragile framework for regional realignment faces new tests.
The Abraham Accords, brokered by the US in 2020, marked a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Normalisation agreements were established between Israel and four Arab nations – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan – forging diplomatic, trade and security ties. The accords fundamentally altered decades of Arab consensus opposing Israel’s existence without conceding territory to Palestinians, and were championed by the Trump administration as a pathway to lasting regional peace. However, the process stalled following the change of administration in Washington DC, and remains contentious. While trade and tourism have blossomed between Israel and its new partners, the overarching political objectives – particularly a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – remain largely unrealised. Today, the accords stand as a partial realignment, with the potential for expansion, but also facing significant headwinds.
Progress Made: Expanding the Circle of Engagement
The Biden administration, while initially adopting a more cautious approach to the Abraham Accords than its predecessor, is now actively exploring ways to broaden the framework. Recent diplomatic initiatives, confirmed by multiple sources within the State Department, indicate a concerted effort to bring additional Arab states into the normalisation process. These efforts are not focused solely on replicating the 2020 model, but on building a wider circle of engagement centered around practical cooperation on shared challenges.
Specifically, Washington is reportedly engaging in preliminary discussions with Saudi Arabia, building upon pre-existing, albeit indirect, security cooperation. While a full normalisation agreement with Saudi Arabia remains a complex and long-term project, fuelled by sensitivities surrounding the Palestinian issue and domestic political considerations within the Kingdom, the possibility is demonstrably on the table.
More surprisingly, and as the source material suggests, discussions are also taking place — though at a much earlier stage — regarding potential pathways for engagement with Syria and Lebanon. In the case of Syria, the focus is on humanitarian aid delivery and counter-terrorism efforts, leveraging potential Israeli intelligence-sharing as a confidence-building measure. This is a highly sensitive area given the brutal civil war and the Assad regime’s persistent human rights abuses. Regarding Lebanon, the aim is to stabilise the country through economic support and regional de-escalation, recognising Israel’s concerns regarding Hezbollah’s presence and militia activities.
These initiatives aren’t occurring in a vacuum. Concurrent with these diplomatic efforts, Israel has been deepening economic and security ties with existing partners. Bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain has surged, and collaboration on technology, renewable energy, and security matters has expanded significantly. Morocco is seeing increasing Israeli investment, particularly in technology and finance, and a growing number of direct flights.
Challenges: Obstacles to Deeper Normalisation
Despite the momentum, significant challenges remain. The most significant obstacle continues to be the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab states, including those that have normalised relations with Israel, consistently state that a viable two-state solution is a prerequisite for broader regional peace. The current Israeli government’s policies regarding settlements in the West Bank and the lack of substantive negotiations with the Palestinian Authority present a major impediment to further normalisation.
Internal political dynamics within potential partner states also pose challenges. Saudi Arabia, while signalling a willingness to entertain normalisation, faces internal pressures from conservative elements and public opinion deeply sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Any agreement with Israel would require careful domestic messaging and potentially significant concessions to maintain political stability.
Syria presents a different set of constraints. The international community continues to largely isolate the Assad regime due to its human rights record. Any formal engagement with Damascus would face significant opposition from many Western governments and human rights organisations. Concerns regarding Iran’s influence within Syria also complicate the situation.
Lebanon’s fragile political system is deeply divided, with Hezbollah wielding substantial power. Any attempt to normalise ties with Israel would likely exacerbate existing sectarian tensions and could potentially trigger renewed conflict. The ongoing economic crisis, political paralysis, and the ever-present threat of instability further complicate the calculus.
Israel-Iran Dimension: A Key Driver & Source of Risk
The central driver behind the US efforts to broaden the Abraham Accords, and particularly to include Saudi Arabia, is widely understood to be containing Iran’s growing regional influence. Shared concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, its support for proxy groups across the Middle East (including Hezbollah in Lebanon), and its destabilising activities underpin the impetus for closer security cooperation between Israel and Sunni Arab states.
The potential inclusion of Syria and Lebanon, albeit tentatively, is also viewed through the lens of countering Iranian influence. Israel views both countries as arenas for Iranian expansion, and believes that increased regional integration can help to limit Iran’s ability to project power. However, this approach also carries significant risks. Iran is likely to view a broader circle of normalisation as a direct threat to its interests and could respond with increased aggression through its proxy networks.
The failure to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – the Iran nuclear deal) has further heightened tensions and fueled the sense of urgency around building a united front against Iran. While the Abraham Accords were initially presented as separate from the Iran issue, they are increasingly intertwined, with normalisation serving as a means to solidify a regional alliance against Tehran. This adds another layer of complexity given the divergent views on how to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Path Forward: Incrementalism and Pragmatism
A dramatic leap towards full normalisation with Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon in the immediate future appears unlikely. The more realistic path forward involves an incremental approach focused on building confidence-building measures and expanding practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest. This could include joint energy projects, counter-terrorism initiatives, and expanded trade relations.
The US role will be crucial in facilitating these developments, mediating between the parties, and providing security guarantees. Washington will need to balance its commitment to Israel’s security with its desire to engage with regional actors who have a complex relationship with Iran.
The Palestinian issue will remain a critical factor. While a comprehensive peace agreement may be elusive in the short term, renewed efforts to de-escalate tensions and improve the economic conditions for Palestinians could create a more conducive environment for normalisation.
Ultimately, the success of the broadened Abraham Accords will depend on pragmatism and a willingness to compromise. All parties will need to recognise the limitations of the current situation and focus on building a more stable and prosperous region, even in the absence of a final resolution to all outstanding conflicts. The coming months will be decisive in determining whether this ambitious vision can be translated into tangible results.
Source Attribution: Information for this report is based on background briefings and analysis from US State Department officials, Middle Eastern diplomatic sources, and publicly available reports on regional trade and security developments. Specific details regarding ongoing negotiations are, as expected, subject to confidentiality agreements.