Diplomatic Analysis: The evolving dynamics of amphibious warfare suggest a move towards unmanned systems, potentially reshaping conflict in littoral zones.
Overview
Recent military developments, particularly the Ukrainian demonstration of a fully unmanned amphibious assault in July 2026, signal a potentially revolutionary shift in amphibious warfare. For decades, the extreme risks associated with opposed amphibious landings – exacerbated by precision-strike weaponry – have led to a decline in such operations. This analysis examines the factors driving this aversion, the implications of unmanned systems for overcoming these risks, and the potential impact on regional security, particularly regarding scenarios involving Iran, Taiwan, and other strategically important littoral environments. The successful deployment of unmanned systems could lower the political and military costs of amphibious operations, leading to a resurgence in their use, yet also introduces new complexities and potential escalation dynamics.
Historical Context
Amphibious assaults have historically been exceptionally challenging military undertakings. From the Gallipoli Campaign to the Normandy landings and the Korean War’s Inchon operation, success depended on achieving surprise, establishing naval and air superiority, and overwhelming firepower. However, the post-Cold War era witnessed a decline in large-scale amphibious operations. The Falklands War highlighted the vulnerability of amphibious task forces to modern anti-ship weapons, and the subsequent rise of precision-guided munitions dramatically increased the risks. Operations planned during the Gulf War (like liberating Kuwait via amphibious assault) were abandoned due to these dangers. This trend continued into the 21st century, with most amphibious landings occurring only against weakly defended adversaries, such as the Sri Lankan operation in 1991, or being avoided altogether. The concentration of power and threat displayed by Iran and China acting as maritime aggressors has not been met with opposing amphibious assault, despite the relatively obvious strategic utility of such an operation. This situation underscores the increasing operational and political barriers to conducting opposed amphibious landings.
Key Actors & Positions
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has traditionally been the primary force responsible for amphibious warfare. While the USMC has adapted with its ‘Force Design 2030’ initiative, and moved away from larger, at-scale forcible entry operations, recent assessments show a willingness to revisit the role of amphibious assault, particularly given technological advancements in unmanned systems. Ukraine has emerged as a pioneer in unmanned amphibious warfare, driven by necessity in its conflict with Russia, demonstrating the feasibility of remotely operated systems. Russia, whilst failing to execute a major amphibious landing at Odesa, retains substantial naval capabilities and is likely adapting to counter unmanned threats. China, with its growing naval power and ambitions regarding Taiwan, has been closely observing these developments, and is likely investing in both unmanned offensive and defensive capabilities. Iran, operating in a confined littoral environment, represents another key actor, developing asymmetric capabilities – including drones and anti-ship missiles – to counter potential amphibious operations.
Analysis
The core issue driving the shift towards unmanned amphibious assault is risk mitigation. Precision-strike capabilities now pose an existential threat to large amphibious ships and the thousands of troops they carry. The potential for significant loss of life and the political fallout that would follow act as a powerful deterrent. Shifting the initial assault wave to unmanned systems radically alters the risk calculus. While unmanned systems can be destroyed, their loss does not carry the same political or emotional weight as the loss of human life. Furthermore, the relatively low cost and rapid production capabilities associated with drones allow for quicker replenishment of losses than traditional amphibious platforms.
However, this transition is not without its challenges. Unmanned systems are vulnerable to electronic warfare, jamming, and cyberattacks. Effective command and control of dispersed, uncrewed forces presents a significant technical hurdle, and the ability to establish a stable beachhead solely with unmanned systems remains unproven. The potential for escalation is also a concern. The proliferation of unmanned systems could lower the threshold for conflict, as nations may be more willing to initiate amphibious operations if the risk to their own personnel is reduced. Importantly, while the initial assault wave might be unmanned, subsequent phases of an amphibious operation, such as securing and expanding a lodgement, will likely still require human forces – at least for the foreseeable future. The true advantage lies in transferring the risk associated with the most dangerous phase of the operation to disposable assets.
Outlook
The trend towards unmanned amphibious warfare is likely to accelerate. Nations will continue to invest in unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) designed for littoral combat. The USMC will likely re-evaluate its future amphibious doctrine, incorporating unmanned systems into its operational planning. We can anticipate increased experimentation and development of these technologies over the next five to ten years.
The impact on regional security is potentially significant. The lowered risk associated with amphibious assault could increase the likelihood of such operations in contested areas like the South China Sea or the Persian Gulf. This, in turn, could lead to an arms race in unmanned systems and a heightened risk of miscalculation and escalation. While the adoption of unmanned systems makes amphibious tactics less reliant on traditional sea and air dominance, the ability to counter such systems through electronic warfare, cyberattacks, and anti-drone weaponry will become increasingly crucial. The next decade will likely see a dynamic interplay between offensive and defensive capabilities in the maritime domain, ultimately reshaping the future of amphibious warfare.
Sources:
* Kerg, B. (2026). The First Waves of Amphibious Assault Will Be Unmanned. War on the Rocks. [https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/the-first-waves-of-amphibious-assault-will-be-unmanned/](https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/the-first-waves-of-amphibious-assault-will-be-unmanned/)
* U.S. Marine Corps. (2020). Force Design 2030. [https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/](https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/)
* USNI News. (Various dates). Coverage of Marine Corps modernization and amphibious warfare. [https://news.usni.org/](https://news.usni.org/) (Referenced for context regarding USMC force design and doctrine)
