Diplomatic Analysis: Past failures in the Middle East suggest that Washington and Jerusalem’s recent attempt to overthrow the Iranian regime was destined to fall short, highlighting the limits of military force in achieving political transformation.
Overview
In February 2026, the United States and Israel launched ‘Operation Epic Fury’ against Iran, with a stated goal—particularly for Israel—of regime change. As of mid-2026, this operation has failed to topple the Islamic Republic, despite the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This analysis examines the broader historical record of regime change operations in the Middle East – encompassing the Suez Crisis, interventions in Lebanon and Libya, the attempts to remove Saddam Hussein, and the 1953 Iranian coup – to illuminate the reasons for this predictable outcome. It assesses the miscalculations that underpinned the recent operation, the risks involved, and potential paths forward, advocating for a shift towards negotiation over continued attempts at forceful regime change.
Historical Context
The pursuit of regime change in the Middle East is not new. Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, external actors have repeatedly attempted to engineer political transitions, often with destabilising consequences. The 1956 Suez Crisis saw Britain and France, alongside Israel, attempting to overthrow Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egyptian government, ultimately resulting in a loss of prestige for the European powers. Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, predicated on the installation of a pro-Israeli leader, also failed. The U.S.-led interventions in Iraq (1991 and 2003) were initially framed, then overtly pursued as regime change operations, decisively failing to produce stable, positive outcomes. The 2011 intervention in Libya, beginning as a humanitarian mission, evolved into a regime change operation which left the country fractured and unstable. Even the seemingly successful 1953 U.S.-backed coup that reinstated the Shah in Iran ultimately sowed the seeds for the 1979 revolution. These historical precedents consistently demonstrate the difficulty of imposing political change from the outside.
Key Actors & Positions
The primary actors in the recent conflict are the United States, Israel, and Iran. The U.S., under President Trump, aimed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to roll back its regional influence, with some degree of commitment to regime change. Israel, under Prime Minister Netanyahu, prioritised regime change as a core goal, viewing the current Iranian government as an existential threat. Iran, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following Khamenei’s death, is focused on regime survival, maintaining its regional influence, and continuing its nuclear program. Regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, have privately supported efforts to contain Iran, but also fear the instability that a collapse of the Islamic Republic could trigger. Russia and China, while not directly involved in the military operation, have deepened their ties with Iran, providing political and economic support.
Analysis
These historical cases reveal recurring patterns of misjudgment. The architects of ‘Operation Epic Fury’, like their predecessors, appear to have conflated military capabilities with the capacity to produce desired political outcomes. They overestimated their ability to translate military power into a stable post-regime political order. The assumption that ‘decapitation’ – the removal of key leaders – would trigger either a collapse of the regime or the emergence of a compliant successor proved to be flawed. Instead, the operation triggered a nationalist backlash and consolidated the position of hardliners within the Iranian government.
Furthermore, the historical record shows a failure to adequately assess the resilience of the existing political order. The Iranian regime, despite facing internal dissent, possessed deep institutional roots and a loyal base of support. The United States and Israel lacked a credible plan for managing the political vacuum that would have resulted from the regime’s overthrow, neglecting the absence of a viable alternative political force. This is a persistent shortcoming in regime change operations.
The 2026 operation also shared the risk, common to those preceding it, of unintended consequences. The conflict has likely strengthened Iran’s relationship with China and Russia, and depleted U.S. military resources needed elsewhere, illustrating the wider, adverse geopolitical implications.
Outlook
The failure of ‘Operation Epic Fury’ suggests that the U.S. and Israel are likely to reassess their approach to Iran. While the temptation to resume military operations may remain, the historical record strongly suggests that this course would only exacerbate existing problems. A more realistic and sustainable path forward requires focusing on de-escalation and diplomacy. Specifically, the United States should abandon the goal of regime change and pursue negotiations towards a revised nuclear agreement with Tehran, potentially building on the framework of the 2015 JCPOA. While accepting a renewed agreement may not be ideal, it represents the least undesirable option compared to continued military escalation and the perpetuation of a failed strategy. A long-term solution will likely require acknowledging the limitations of external intervention and finding a way to coexist with – and manage the risks posed by – the Islamic Republic.
Source References
Jackson, G. (2026). An Unlearned Lesson: The Sorry Record of Regime Change Operations in the Middle East. War on the Rocks. [https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/an-unlearned-lesson-the-sorry-record-of-regime-change-operations-in-the-middle-east/](https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/an-unlearned-lesson-the-sorry-record-of-regime-change-operations-in-the-middle-east/)
