Abraham Accords: A fragile network of agreements reshaped by regional dynamics.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020 under the Trump administration, marked a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. They saw Israel normalise relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, moving beyond decades of Arab rejectionism. These agreements encompassed diplomatic recognition, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange, underpinned by shared concerns about Iran’s regional influence. While hailed as a potential catalyst for broader regional peace, the Accords haven’t expanded since Sudan’s formalisation in early 2023. Momentum has slowed, and the path towards full normalisation with Saudi Arabia, long considered the ‘big prize’, has become increasingly challenging. The accords stand today as a layered achievement, promising significant benefits but also susceptible to the volatility inherent in the region, with the war in Gaza further complicating the landscape.
Progress Made: Economic Ties and Shifting Perceptions
Despite the wider geopolitical headwinds, the existing Accords have yielded tangible benefits, particularly in economic cooperation. Trade between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain has surged, reaching billions of dollars annually. Sectors like tourism, technology, and renewable energy have seen significant investment and collaborative projects. The UAE, notably, has enthusiastically pursued business opportunities with Israeli firms, viewing them as innovative partners. Bahrain has focussed on financial partnerships, while Morocco’s cooperation has centered on defence and security, including intelligence sharing.
The accords also prompted a subtle, yet perceptible, shift in public discourse within the signatory states. While critical voices remain, official media narratives generally promote the benefits of normalisation, highlighting economic gains and the potential for regional stability. Cultural exchanges, initially modest, are expanding, fostering people-to-people interactions previously unthinkable. However, this positive sentiment hasn’t necessarily translated into widespread popular support, particularly where political systems limit public expression.
Crucially, existing diplomatic channels have provided a platform for previously closed-door contacts, allowing for co-operation on shared challenges – although such co-operation is often discreet and unpublicised. The burgeoning security cooperation, particularly regarding Iranian drone technology and maritime security, provides a level of strategic alignment not seen previously and has prompted discussions about regional air defence systems.
Challenges: Public Opinion, Yemen and Domestic Constraints
The potential normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel faces significantly more resistance than the previous instances. A key factor is public opinion within the Kingdom. Reports suggest a growing disquiet amongst Saudi citizens regarding any potential deal with Israel, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict in Gaza, and a perceived lack of sufficient progress on the Palestinian issue. This sentiment is fuelled by strong historical ties to the Palestinian cause and exacerbated by social media discourse. While the Saudi government traditionally controls its media narrative tightly, the influence of online platforms and regional media outlets circulates alternative perspectives.
The ongoing conflict in Yemen adds another layer of complexity. Saudi Arabia’s leadership is deeply engaged in attempts to resolve the conflict, and any perceived prioritisation of normalisation with Israel over securing a lasting peace in Yemen risks undermining regional trust and legitimacy. Furthermore, the war has strained Saudi resources and attention, diverting focus from other diplomatic initiatives. The Houthi rebels in Yemen, backed by Iran, consistently denounce normalisation efforts, framing them as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and a strengthening of Saudi Arabia’s strategic adversaries.
Internally, the Saudi leadership faces a delicate balancing act between its strategic interests – including bolstering its security architecture and diversifying its economy – and managing domestic constituencies with deep-rooted reservations about Israel. These domestic constraints limit the flexibility of negotiations. The succession plans within the Kingdom and the need to maintain internal stability add to the pressures facing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Israel-Iran Dimension: A Core Driver & Growing Risk
For Merlows’ readership, the Israel-Iran dynamic remains central to understanding the Abraham Accords. The initial impetus for the accords was, in part, a shared concern amongst Arab states regarding Iran’s expansionist policies and nuclear ambitions. Normalisation offered a potential security architecture to counter Iranian influence, implicitly forming a de facto alliance.
However, the escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, particularly following the events of 7th October and subsequent attacks on Iranian interests, have cast a shadow over the normalisation process. The prospect of a wider regional conflict raises serious questions about the viability of any new agreements. Any escalation risks pushing Saudi Arabia further into a difficult position, balancing its security concerns with its domestic constraints and regional responsibilities.
Iran actively opposes normalisation, viewing it as a strategic encirclement. Tehran’s support for proxies like the Houthis, who are actively hostile to any rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, acts as a further destabilising force. Should Iran perceive Saudi progress towards formalising ties as an existential threat, it is likely to intensify its efforts to undermine the process, potentially through disruptive actions in Yemen or elsewhere.
Path Forward: Incremental Steps and Revised Expectations
The path toward full Saudi-Israeli normalisation is now considerably more arduous than it appeared just months ago. The current conditions – the ongoing war in Gaza, the hardening of public opinion within Saudi Arabia, and the heightened tensions with Iran – greatly complicate the process. A broad, comprehensive agreement appears unlikely in the near term.
A more realistic scenario involves incremental steps, such as continued, but discreet, security cooperation, and a gradual expansion of economic ties under existing frameworks. Focus may shift towards smaller, more manageable agreements in specific sectors, avoiding the politically charged issue of full diplomatic recognition for now.
The Biden administration’s involvement will be critical. While initially supportive of the Abraham Accords, its emphasis on human rights and Palestinian issues has introduced additional complexities. Finding a formula that addresses Saudi concerns regarding a pathway towards Palestinian statehood will be crucial. Perhaps a renewed US-led effort to revive the peace process, even if it doesn’t yield immediate results, could create a more favourable environment.
Ultimately, the speed and extent of any further normalisation will depend on a complex interplay of regional dynamics, domestic political calculations, and the evolving security landscape. Expectations must be tempered, and a pragmatic, phased approach seems the most likely path forward.
Source Attribution: This report is based on analysis of publicly available information, incorporating insights from regional political analysts and informed observers with expertise in Saudi Arabian and Israeli affairs. While direct sourcing is limited due to the sensitivity of ongoing negotiations and diplomatic discussions, the reporting draws on patterns observed in regional media, security assessments, and commentary from think tanks focusing on the Middle East. The title of this article reflects the primary trend identified within these sources – a significant cooling of public sentiment in Saudi Arabia towards the prospect of normalisation with Israel.