Abraham Accords: Examining the stalled Sudanese path towards full normalisation with Israel.
Context
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020 under the Trump administration, represent a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. They saw Israel establish diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and, initially, Sudan. The core principle underpinning the Accords was a quid pro quo – recognition of Israel in exchange for benefits, primarily from the United States, such as arms sales or the removal of Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. While the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco swiftly implemented full normalisation, including opening embassies and establishing trade ties, Sudan’s journey has been protracted and fraught with complications. The underlying ambition was to foster greater regional stability and economic cooperation, countering Iranian influence, though the degree to which this has been achieved remains debatable. Today, the Accords framework continues to be a focal point for diplomatic efforts, albeit one increasingly shaped by evolving regional dynamics and Washington’s shifting priorities.
Progress Made
Sudan’s initial commitment to normalisation stemmed from a complex political calculation following the ousting of long-time President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. The transitional government, led by a civilian-military council, sought economic relief and international legitimacy. A key demand for this was Sudan’s removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list, which occurred in December 2020 – a move directly linked to the agreement to normalise ties with Israel. This removal unlocked crucial financial aid and investment opportunities for Sudan, desperately needed to address its economic crisis.
Immediately following the agreement, quiet security cooperation between Israel and Sudan began, largely focused on intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism efforts. There were early discussions regarding agreements on agricultural cooperation, water management, and aviation overflight rights. Israeli companies also expressed interest in investing in Sudanese industries, particularly in the agriculture and tech sectors.
In early 2021, Sudanese officials publicly affirmed their commitment to the normalisation process, outlining plans for opening liaison offices in each country as a precursor to full embassies. Joint committees were established to explore avenues for economic and cultural exchange. Travel restrictions between the two countries were eased, and initial delegations from both sides engaged in exploratory visits. However, concrete economic deals proved elusive, hindered by Sudan’s internal political instability and the lack of a clear legal framework to govern such investments. There have been reports of Israeli assistance in developing Sudanese cybersecurity capabilities, indicating a deepening albeit discreet security relationship.
Challenges
Despite these initial steps, Sudan’s path to full normalisation has stalled dramatically. The primary impediment is the ongoing political turmoil within Sudan itself. The October 2021 military coup, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, derailed the democratic transition and triggered widespread protests. This coup led to the suspension of US aid, further exacerbating Sudan’s economic woes and creating a climate of uncertainty for potential investors.
The coup also fractured Sudanese public opinion regarding Israel. Broad swathes of the population remain deeply opposed to normalisation, viewing it as a betrayal of Palestinian solidarity. Powerful political factions, including Islamist groups, actively campaign against any further rapprochement with Israel. The influence of these groups, combined with the military’s consolidation of power, has effectively put the normalisation process on ice.
Widespread protests and armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), erupting in April 2023, represent an existential threat to Sudan’s stability. This conflict has completely overshadowed the normalisation agenda, diverting attention and resources towards humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution. The ongoing violence has created a security vacuum, attracting the attention of regional actors and further complicating the political landscape. Even setting aside political objections, the practical task of establishing formal diplomatic relations and economic partnerships is impossible under the current circumstances. The absence of a clear, internationally recognised civilian government severely limits any possibility of progress.
Israel-Iran Dimension
The stalled Sudan normalisation process is being closely watched in the context of the evolving Israel-Iran relationship. A fully normalised Sudan, particularly with a stable government, would represent another strategic gain for Israel in its efforts to contain Iranian influence in the region. Iran maintains close ties with various factions within Sudan, and a stronger Israeli presence could potentially counter Iranian activities.
The Abraham Accords, generally, were partly motivated by a desire to forge a united front against Iran. However, Iran has actively sought to undermine the Accords, strengthening ties with actors who oppose normalisation. Iran’s support for Palestinian militant groups, and its broader regional network, adds to the complexity.
Sudan’s geographic location – bordering the Red Sea and bordering countries with existing Israeli ties like Egypt and Jordan – is strategically important. Israel views Sudan as a potential partner in maritime security cooperation, particularly regarding threats from Yemen, where Iran-backed Houthi rebels operate. The current instability in Sudan allows Iran to potentially exploit the security vacuum, potentially providing support to groups opposed to normalisation or further destabilising the country.
Path Forward
The prospect of full normalisation between Sudan and Israel remains deeply uncertain in the short to medium term. The immediate priority must be a cessation of hostilities and a return to a civilian-led transition. Without a stable, unified government that enjoys broad domestic legitimacy, any further steps towards normalisation are unlikely.
Conditional upon a peaceful resolution to the conflict, external actors, particularly the United States, could play a crucial role in incentivising a return to the normalisation track. However, the US’s own credibility has been damaged by the shifting geopolitical landscape and its perceived waning interest in the region. Direct economic and security incentives, targeted at addressing Sudan’s most pressing needs, will be essential.
Even then, any renewed push for normalisation will need to address deeply held public concerns regarding Palestinian rights and the potential economic benefits for Sudan. A phased approach, starting with expanded security cooperation and targeted economic initiatives, might be more realistic than attempting to replicate the rapid pace of normalisation seen with other countries. A credible commitment to humanitarian aid and economic development, directly benefiting the Sudanese people, could help shift public perceptions. Ultimately, Sudan’s normalisation journey is intrinsically tied to its internal political future and wider regional power dynamics.
Source: Analysis based on publicly available information and expert commentary regarding the Abraham Accords and Sudanese political developments. No specific source document was provided. Sources include reporting from Reuters, Associated Press, Middle East Eye, and Al Jazeera, as well as think-tank analysis from the International Crisis Group and the Middle East Institute.
