Abraham Accords: A fragile network of agreements seeking to redefine regional dynamics.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020, represent a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Initiated under the Trump administration, they saw Israel normalise relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and, tentatively, Sudan. The core principle behind the Accords involved Israel and these Arab nations recognising each other diplomatically, establishing full economic and cultural ties, in exchange for Israel suspending its planned annexation of portions of the West Bank. While the UAE and Bahrain have swiftly and visibly deepened their relationships with Israel, Morocco’s progress is steady but marked by political complexities, and Sudan’s journey to full normalisation remains heavily stalled, overshadowed by internal conflict and political instability. The overarching goal, proponents state, is to foster regional stability and economic cooperation, though critics argue they sideline the Palestinian issue and exacerbate existing divisions.
Progress Made: A Troubled Transition in Khartoum
Sudan’s initial agreement to normalise ties with Israel in October 2020, via a US-brokered deal, was inextricably linked to the political transition following the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019. The deal promised substantial US economic assistance, crucial for Sudan’s fragile economy, in return for Sudan joining the Abraham Accords. Following the agreement, a civilian-led transitional government, spearheaded by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, began taking steps toward normalisation – passing legislation outlining the process and engaging in initial, though limited, economic discussions with Israel.
There were early signs of cooperation. The two countries discussed collaboration in areas such as agriculture, water management and counter-terrorism. Limited trade began, with Israeli companies exploring investment opportunities in Sudan, particularly in agricultural technologies critical for enhancing Sudan’s food security. However, formal, high-level diplomatic visits were sparse, reflecting both domestic sensitivities in Sudan and the speed of the transition.
The most concrete step taken was the signing of a joint declaration in January 2021, outlining areas of cooperation. Nevertheless, the declaration was largely symbolic due to the rapidly escalating political tensions within Sudan. The pre-existing military-civilian power-sharing agreement intended to guide Sudan towards democracy began to fray, ultimately culminating in the military coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in October 2021. This coup essentially halted the normalisation process.
Challenges: Coup, Conflict and Domestic Opposition
The October 2021 coup dramatically altered the trajectory of Sudan’s potential normalisation with Israel. General al-Burhan’s seizure of power led to widespread international condemnation and a suspension of US economic assistance, frustrating the core incentive for Sudan’s initial agreement. Critically, the coup sidelined civilian actors, including those who had tentatively supported normalisation, and empowered hardliners opposed to any ties with Israel.
The outbreak of violent conflict in April 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has rendered normalisation effectively impossible. The ongoing civil war has plunged Sudan into a humanitarian crisis, with millions displaced and the country on the brink of collapse. Any political capital that might have been used to advance the Abraham Accords has been entirely consumed by the fight for control.
Even before the war, significant domestic opposition to normalisation persisted within Sudan. Islamist groups, remnants of the al-Bashir regime, and sections of the Sudanese public viewed the normalisation efforts as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and a surrender to Western influence. These groups actively campaigned against the agreement and exploited the post-coup instability to undermine any further progress. The conflict has amplified these voices, making a future return to normalisation discussions extremely difficult, even should a peaceful resolution be achieved. The issue is now deeply intertwined with wider questions of Sudanese sovereignty and political legitimacy.
Israel-Iran Dimension: Regional Power Dynamics
The Abraham Accords’ underlying rationale, particularly concerning Sudan, is rooted in a broader regional strategy to contain Iranian influence. The US and Israel view Iran as a destabilising force in the Middle East, and normalisation with Sudan was partially intended to create a more unified front against Tehran. Sudan, strategically located in the Horn of Africa and with historical ties to both Iran and Saudi Arabia, was seen as a potential partner in countering Iranian activities in the region.
However, the current conflict has significantly complicated this equation. The SPLM-N (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North) faction has claimed the RSF are receiving support from unnamed actors allegedly linked to Iran, accusations the RSF deny. This potential entanglement risks transforming the Sudanese conflict into a proxy war between regional rivals. Furthermore, the weakening of the Sudanese state creates a power vacuum that Iran could potentially exploit to expand its influence, undermining the original intention behind seeking normalisation. The breakdown of the normalisation process in Sudan, therefore, represents a setback to the broader regional effort to isolate Iran.
Path Forward: A Distant Prospect
Realistically, a resumption of normalisation efforts between Sudan and Israel is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. The immediate priority is to end the ongoing conflict and establish a stable, inclusive government in Sudan. Any discussion of normalisation will be contingent on the establishment of a legitimate, civilian-led authority that has a broad mandate to represent the Sudanese people.
Even then, significant obstacles remain. The US and international community would need to reinstate economic assistance, offering credible incentives for Sudan to re-engage with the Abraham Accords. However, this will likely be tied to democratic reforms and a commitment to human rights – conditions difficult to guarantee in the current environment.
A prolonged period of political instability and economic hardship will likely further entrench opposition to normalisation, making it increasingly difficult for any future government to pursue this path. The longer the conflict continues, the more deeply ingrained the anti-normalisation sentiment will become, and the higher the political cost of attempting to revive the process. While the Abraham Accords remain a strategic priority for Israel and the US, Sudan’s journey toward normalisation appears, for now, decisively interrupted.
Source: Merlows Research and Analysis, incorporating review of publicly available political commentary, regional security briefings and historical background on Sudanese political transitions (May 2024).
