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The Saudi Equation: Weighing the Case for Joining the Abraham Accords

Abraham Accords: A new framework for Middle Eastern diplomacy and strategic alignment.

Context

The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, represent a paradigm shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. By facilitating the normalisation of relations between Israel and a group of Arab nations—including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco—the Accords moved beyond the traditional “land-for-peace” formula that had stalled for decades. Instead, they prioritised shared strategic interests, economic integration, and a collective desire to curb regional instability.

Today, the Accords are more than mere diplomatic gestures; they are functional partnerships involving billions of dollars in trade, security cooperation, and cultural exchanges. However, the architecture remains incomplete. The “holy grail” of this diplomatic movement is the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites and the region’s preeminent economic power. Whether Riyadh joins the framework remains the central question for the stability and expansion of the Accords.

Progress Made

The case for Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords is built upon a foundation of pragmatic alignment that has grown steadily behind the scenes. While official ties remain absent, the strategic convergence between Riyadh and Jerusalem is evident in their shared perception of regional threats. Both nations view the expansion of Iranian influence and the proliferation of proxy militias across the “Shiite Crescent” as existential risks. This shared security calculus has created a conduit for covert intelligence sharing and a mutual interest in establishing a regional defence architecture.

Economically, the synergy is equally compelling. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030”, spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, seeks to diversify the Kingdom’s economy away from oil. Israel’s global leadership in cybersecurity, water management, agricultural technology (AgTech), and semiconductors offers the precise expertise Riyadh requires to modernise its infrastructure. A formalised agreement would unlock massive investment flows and allow Saudi Arabia to integrate into a high-tech trade corridor stretching from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, the precedent set by the UAE and Bahrain has lowered the political cost for Saudi Arabia. The “normalization taboo” has been broken by peer states, demonstrating that ties with Israel do not necessarily alienate other Arab partners or diminish a state’s standing in the Islamic world. The progress is visible in a gradual shift in Saudi public discourse and the cautious opening of channels that allow for potential diplomatic breakthroughs. By joining the Accords, Saudi Arabia would not merely be following a trend, but would be asserting its leadership role, ensuring that any regional realignment happens on Riyadh’s terms and under its strategic guidance.

Challenges

Despite the strategic logic, the path to normalisation is fraught with systemic obstacles. The most prominent challenge is the Palestinian issue. For decades, the Arab Peace Initiative—which demanded a full Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state—was the gold standard for diplomacy. While the Abraham Accords bypassed this, Saudi Arabia occupies a unique position as the leader of the Sunni Muslim world. Consequently, Riyadh cannot afford to be seen as “abandoning” the Palestinians. Any deal would likely require a tangible “peace package” for Palestinians, including a credible path toward statehood, to ensure domestic and pan-Islamic legitimacy.

Internally, the Saudi leadership must balance the Crown Prince’s pragmatic ambitions with the sentiments of a conservative religious establishment and a youthful population sensitive to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A sudden diplomatic leap without sufficient prerequisites could trigger internal instability or provide ammunition to regional rivals.

Furthermore, the volatility of Israeli internal politics presents a significant hurdle. The shift toward more hardline government stances in Jerusalem—particularly regarding settlement expansion in the West Bank—complicates Riyadh’s ability to justify a deal. Saudi Arabia requires a stable, predictable partner. The current political fragmentation within Israel makes it difficult for the Kingdom to secure the long-term guarantees it seeks, particularly regarding security assurances from the United States. Riyadh views a formalised deal not just as a bilateral agreement with Israel, but as a tripartite arrangement involving a comprehensive US-Saudi defence pact, which remains a point of intense negotiation and friction.

Israel-Iran Dimension

At the heart of the Merlows focus is the overarching shadow cast by Tehran. The Israel-Iran rivalry is the primary engine driving the push for Saudi normalisation. Both Jerusalem and Riyadh view Iran’s “export of revolution” and its support for groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis as a direct threat to their sovereign stability.

For Israel, a Saudi ally would effectively dismantle the “Arab ring” that Iran has attempted to build, isolating Tehran and creating a formidable strategic bloc. For Saudi Arabia, aligning with Israel provides a deterrent against Iranian aggression and secures an implicit link to US military capabilities. This “enemy of my enemy” logic is the strongest glue holding the case for the Accords together. However, this dimension also adds risk: any perceived move toward normalisation may provoke Iran to escalate attacks via its proxies, forcing Riyadh to weigh the benefits of a new alliance against the immediate cost of increased regional volatility.

Path Forward

Realistically, the path forward for Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be a sudden announcement, but rather a phased “incrementalism”. We can expect to see further “under-the-table” cooperation in security and technology before any public diplomatic breakthrough. The Kingdom will likely continue to demand a “grand bargain” that includes a Palestinian component and a formal US security guarantee.

The immediate future depends on the synchronisation of three variables: the stability of the Israeli government, the appetite of the US administration to broker a deal, and the level of perceived threat emanating from Iran. If these align, Riyadh may move toward a “normalization-lite” phase—opening trade offices or allowing limited travel—before committing to full diplomatic ties. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia will join the Abraham Accords when the cost of remaining outside the bloc exceeds the political risk of entering it. For now, the Kingdom remains the strategic pivot upon which the future of Middle Eastern integration turns.

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Source Attribution: This report is based on an analysis of the strategic arguments presented in “The case for Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords”.