Abraham Accords: A precarious web of diplomacy faces new strain from escalating maritime conflict.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020, represent a landmark shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Initiated under the Trump administration, the agreements normalised relations between Israel and several Arab nations – initially the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, later Morocco and Sudan. The core principle underpinning the Accords was the recognition that a shared opposition to Iran and its regional influence could foster cooperation, alongside economic and security benefits for all parties. While Sudan’s participation has since become fraught with internal conflict, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco maintain formal diplomatic ties with Israel. The Accords haven’t resolved the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but offered a novel, parallel track for regional stability – a stability now severely tested by recent events in the Red Sea. The potential for broadened normalisation – with Saudi Arabia repeatedly touted as a potential next signatory – remains a key, if increasingly distant, goal.
Progress Made
Recent months have evidenced continuing, albeit often subtle, advancements spurred by the Abraham Accords framework. Trade between Israel and its Arab partners – the UAE particularly – has flourished. Bilateral trade exceeded $2.7 billion in 2023, encompassing sectors from technology and tourism to agriculture and renewable energy. Beyond commerce, security cooperation has deepened, mainly focusing on countering drone and missile threats, an area where the shared anxieties around Iran have fuelled collaboration.
Joint military exercises, though largely unpublicised, are regularly conducted, primarily between Israel, the UAE and sometimes Bahrain. These drills enhance interoperability and address shared security concerns. Intelligence sharing, while maintained under a veil of secrecy, has demonstrably increased. Furthermore, the implementation of various economic agreements, such as those relating to free zones and investment protection, is proceeding, signalling a commitment to long-term economic partnerships.
Cultural exchanges have also expanded. Direct flights have boosted tourism, creating people-to-people connections. Academic and scientific collaborations are fostering innovation and knowledge transfer. While progress isn’t uniform across all signatory states – Morocco’s engagement has been more cautious, and Sudan’s situation has derailed momentum – the overall trajectory has been one of cautious but tangible integration. These developments, however, are now overshadowed by the escalating crisis in the Red Sea, prompted by Houthi attacks on commercial shipping.
Challenges
The Houthi attacks on vessels navigating the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait represent a significant challenge to the progress facilitated by the Abraham Accords. These attacks, launched in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, disrupt global trade routes, drive up shipping costs, and destabilise regional security. The stated intention to target vessels linked to Israel, or those heading to Israeli ports, directly impacts commercial interests associated with countries that have normalised relations, particularly the UAE.
The situation casts a shadow over the economic benefits envisioned by the Accords. Shipping companies are diverting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks and substantial costs to journeys. This disruption threatens to undermine the nascent trade relationships fostered through normalisation. Moreover, the escalating tensions risk drawing regional actors into a wider conflict.
Internal political considerations within signatory states also present challenges. Public opinion in many Arab countries remains critical of normalisation with Israel, and the situation in Gaza has exacerbated these sentiments. Governments face a delicate balancing act between maintaining their commitments under the Accords and responding to domestic pressure. The Saudi leadership’s ongoing consideration of normalisation is particularly susceptible to these contextual shifts. Finally, the broader regional environment— characterised by ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq— continues to pose a systemic risk to long-term stability.
Israel-Iran Dimension
The Houthis are widely considered a proxy of Iran. Their actions in the Red Sea are interpreted by many as a direct attempt by Iran to exert pressure on Israel and its allies, and to disrupt the progress made towards regional normalisation. Iran benefits from the chaos caused by the attacks, as it reinforces its narrative of resisting Western and Israeli influence in the region.
This directly undermines the foundational logic of the Abraham Accords: that shared concerns about Iranian expansionism can drive cooperation. The Houthi attacks exacerbate those concerns. The Accords’ architects believed that a united front against Iran would deter aggressive actions. However, Iran, seemingly emboldened, is operating through proxies to project power and challenge the existing order.
Furthermore, the attacks are impacting the security calculus of potential future normalisation partners, such as Saudi Arabia. Riyadh now has to consider the potential for blowback from Iran, and the risk of being targeted if it formalises relations with Israel. The situation also increases the likelihood of a military escalation, drawing both Israel and Iran closer to direct conflict, a scenario that would fundamentally alter the regional landscape and potentially unravel the Accords entirely.
Path Forward
The immediate priority must be de-escalation in the Red Sea. A sustained ceasefire in Gaza, coupled with diplomatic efforts to address the underlying grievances of the Houthis, is essential. However, the Houthis’ firm alignment with Iran complicates the prospects for a purely negotiated solution. Increased international naval presence— as seen with Operation Prosperity Guardian— can help protect shipping lanes, but it’s a temporary fix.
In the longer term, reviving the Abraham Accords’ momentum requires reaffirming its core principles and addressing the concerns of all stakeholders. This means renewing dialogue with Saudi Arabia, acknowledging and validating Palestinian grievances, and fostering economic initiatives that benefit all regional actors, not just Israel and its immediate partners.
The crisis also highlights the need for a more robust regional security architecture, one that goes beyond bilateral agreements and encompasses broader cooperation on maritime security and counter-terrorism. This is a long-term project, but one that is now more urgent than ever. Realistically, full-scale normalisation – especially with Saudi Arabia – is unlikely in the short term. The immediate focus should be on preserving the existing agreements and preventing further escalation, with the hope that a path towards more comprehensive peace can be forged in the future.
Source: Analysis derived from expert assessment of recent developments in the Red Sea, informed by publicly available information regarding the Abraham Accords, regional security dynamics, and the role of Iran and its proxies. Further research based on think tank reports from the Middle East Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the International Crisis Group. Independent observation of geopolitical trends was additionally utilised.
