Abraham Accords: Two years on, the path to wider regional normalisation faces significant headwinds.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020 under the Trump administration, represent a historic shift in Middle Eastern diplomacy. They saw Israel establish diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan – countries with which it had previously lacked formal ties. The agreements aimed to reshape regional dynamics, focusing on economic cooperation, security collaboration, and a recalibration of the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though its resolution was not a prerequisite. While Sudan’s implementation has been stalled by internal political upheaval, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco have all taken significant steps towards full normalisation, including opening embassies, establishing trade relationships, and fostering tourism. The accords, however, were not universally welcomed and remain contentious, particularly concerning the Palestinian issue and regional power balances. Efforts to expand the agreements have met with limited success, and recent developments, particularly Syria’s firm rejection of any possibility of joining, highlight the substantial obstacles that remain.
Progress Made: Building on Existing Ties
Since the initial signings, the Abraham Accords have generated tangible progress, although often overshadowed by ongoing regional tensions. Trade between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco has risen exponentially. In 2023, non-oil trade between Israel and the UAE exceeded $2.7 billion, a substantial increase from negligible figures before the agreement. Bahrain and Morocco have followed suit, forging economic partnerships across sectors like technology, agriculture and tourism.
Beyond economics, security cooperation has quietly deepened. Joint military exercises and intelligence sharing, particularly regarding Iran, have increased between Israel and the Gulf states. This collaboration is often conducted discreetly, aiming to build a united front against perceived regional threats.
Cultural exchanges and tourism have also flourished. Direct flights between Israel and the participating Arab nations have become commonplace, fostering people-to-people connections. Agreements on visa regulations and educational programs are expanding, contributing to a gradual shift in public perceptions. Within Morocco, for instance, a curriculum revision to acknowledge Jewish history within the country’s broader narrative has begun, a symbolically important development. There are ongoing discussions about joint infrastructure projects, including pipelines and electricity grids, that could further solidify economic interdependence and foster regional stability. While not directly tied to the Accords, Saudi Arabia, despite not formalising relations, has allowed Israeli overflights and is engaged in indirect security cooperation with Israel.
Challenges: Entrenched Positions and Domestic Concerns
Despite the progress, significant challenges impede the wider expansion of the Accords. Primarily, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a major stumbling block. Many Arab states are hesitant to normalise relations with Israel further without substantial progress towards a two-state solution and improved conditions for Palestinians. Renewed violence in the West Bank and Gaza consistently derails normalisation efforts, raising domestic criticism in potential candidate countries.
Domestic political considerations within the signatory states also present obstacles. While the UAE and Bahrain have seen relatively smooth implementation, Morocco faces internal opposition from Islamist groups and segments of public opinion critical of normalising ties with Israel. In Sudan, the ongoing conflict has completely stalled any further progress towards formalising the agreement, and its future remains deeply uncertain.
Beyond the Palestinian question, regional rivalries and geopolitical tensions add complexity. Iran’s opposition to normalisation is vociferous and actively works to undermine the Accords through its regional proxies. Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and its support for militant groups further complicate the security landscape, making some Arab states wary of fully aligning with Israel. Furthermore, inconsistent US foreign policy – shifting administrations and fluctuating levels of engagement – introduces uncertainty and reduces the incentive for countries to take politically risky steps towards normalisation. The recent Israeli judicial overhaul has been publicly criticised by some leaders in the region, raising questions about the long-term stability of Israel’s democratic institutions and potentially impacting future diplomatic calculations.
Israel-Iran Dimension: A Proxy Battleground
The push for normalisation is inextricably linked to shared concerns about Iranian influence in the region. The Abraham Accords, in part, represent a tacit alignment between Israel and several Arab states against Iran. Iran views the Accords as a direct threat to its regional ambitions and actively seeks to counter them.
Syria’s categorical rejection of joining the Accords, as recently stated, is largely dictated by its close alliance with Iran. Damascus serves as a key hub for Iranian military operations and a conduit for the flow of arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Normalising ties with Israel would fundamentally undermine this relationship and jeopardise Syria’s continued reliance on Iranian support.
Israel views Iran as an existential threat and prioritises containing its influence. The Accords facilitate greater intelligence sharing and potential security cooperation with Arab states to address this concern. Israel’s increased freedom of operation in the region, enabled by the improved relations, is largely aimed at disrupting Iran’s nuclear programme and limiting its proxy network. The simple existence of these relationships alters the regional calculus, forcing Iran to reassess its strategies and potentially leading to increased escalation, either through proxy groups or direct confrontation.
Path Forward: Incremental Steps and Pragmatism
The prospects for a rapid expansion of the Abraham Accords appear limited. A breakthrough with Saudi Arabia remains the ‘grand prize’ but hinges on significant concessions to the Palestinians and a more favourable regional environment. Incremental progress is more likely, focusing on deepening existing ties and exploring limited normalisation steps with countries that have strategic incentive.
Oman, for example, has maintained discreet ties with Israel for years and could be a potential candidate for a formal agreement. Qatar, while a key ally of Iran, also maintains channels of communication with Israel and could explore limited cooperation on specific issues.
The key to progress lies in a pragmatic approach that prioritises practical cooperation on shared interests – security, water resources, energy and trade – while sidelining the more intractable political disputes. Continued US diplomatic engagement, even if limited, is vital to encourage and facilitate such cooperation. Realistically, further expansion will require a significant shift in regional dynamics, perhaps prompted by a heightened threat from Iran or a renewed push for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At present, Syria’s firm stance signals that the immediate horizon for broader normalisation remains obscured.
Source: This report is based on analysis of publicly available information regarding the Abraham Accords, regional security dynamics and recent statements from diplomatic sources, informed by the stated news line: “Damascus says no: Syria rules out joining the Accords.” The report also draws upon established reporting and analysis from international news agencies and think tanks specialising in Middle Eastern affairs.