Abraham Accords: A fragile framework seeking renewed momentum amidst regional shifts.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020 under the Trump administration, represented a significant departure in Middle Eastern geopolitics. They saw Israel formalise diplomatic relations with four Arab nations – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan – moving beyond decades of animosity and non-recognition. These agreements were underpinned by shared concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence and a desire for economic cooperation. While the accords didn’t resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they established a new paradigm of pragmatic, state-to-state engagement. Today, the promise of wider normalisation remains largely unrealised, facing headwinds from regional instability – particularly the war in Gaza – and shifting geopolitical priorities. The question now is whether the accords can be salvaged and expanded, or if they represent a fleeting moment of opportunity lost.
Progress Made
Despite the current strains, substantial progress has been made since the signing of the Abraham Accords. Trade between Israel and the participating Arab nations has experienced significant growth. With the UAE, non-oil trade exceeded $2.7 billion in 2023, a nearly 14% increase from the previous year. Bahrain has doubled trade with Israel since normalisation. Morocco is seeing increased Israeli investment, predominantly in technology and infrastructure. Tourism is also flourishing; tens of thousands of Israelis visited Morocco and the UAE in 2023, and vice versa, injecting vital revenue into these economies.
Beyond economics, security cooperation has deepened, particularly between Israel and the UAE. These nations share intelligence related to regional threats, primarily Iran, and have conducted joint military exercises – though these have significantly reduced in profile recently. Diplomatic exchanges have become commonplace, with numerous high-level visits and the establishment of embassies and consulates.
Crucially, the accords spurred a re-evaluation of previously held assumptions about Arab-Israeli relations. They demonstrated that normalisation was possible outside the context of a final status agreement with the Palestinians, challenging the long-held Arab position of conditioning relations with Israel on Palestinian statehood. This shift, while controversial, opened new avenues for dialogue and cooperation. Finally, there’s been a growth in people-to-people exchanges, with cultural programmes and academic collaborations attempting to build bridges between societies.
Challenges
The war in Gaza, triggered by Hamas’ attack on 7 October 2023, has severely tested the Abraham Accords. Arab public opinion, already critical of normalising ties with Israel, has become overwhelmingly negative. Several nations, including Jordan and Egypt, who didn’t sign the accords, have vocally condemned Israel’s military actions, and have at times strained their own relationships with Israel.
Bahrain and Morocco have also publicly distanced themselves from Israel, suspending diplomatic relations in protest. While the UAE maintains relations, it has significantly toned down public displays of cooperation. The existing economic ties, however, have largely remained intact, indicating a reluctance to fully dismantle the foundations built over the past four years, although growth has stalled.
Beyond the immediate fallout of the Gaza conflict, deeper challenges persist. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, and Palestinians feel excluded from the normalisation process. This fuels resentment and contributes to regional instability. Internal political dynamics within the Arab signatory nations also play a role. Public opposition to normalisation remains strong in many countries, limiting governments’ ability to further deepen ties.
Furthermore, the volatile regional landscape introduces risk. Escalations involving Iran, as well as continued conflicts in Yemen and Syria, can easily derail normalisation efforts. Concerns about Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank continue to raise eyebrows amongst Arab capitals, undermining trust. Finally, differing priorities among the involved parties – with some focusing on economic benefits and others on security concerns – create friction and necessitate constant diplomatic management.
Israel-Iran Dimension
The Abraham Accords were, in part, driven by shared anxieties about Iran’s growing influence in the region. The participating Arab states viewed a stronger relationship with Israel as a means of counterbalancing Iranian power and securing their own national interests. Normalisation was seen as a bolstering of a de facto anti-Iran alliance.
The current conflict has arguably heightened these concerns. Iran’s support for Hamas and other proxy groups has reinforced fears about its destabilising role. While the accords haven’t directly translated into a united military front against Iran, they have enabled increased intelligence sharing and security cooperation designed to monitor and deter Iranian activities.
However, the escalation also carries risks. Iran may actively seek to undermine the accords by increasing its support for groups opposed to normalisation, and by exploiting anti-Israel sentiment. The possibility of a wider regional conflict involving Iran could fundamentally alter the geopolitical landscape, potentially rendering the accords irrelevant. There’s a growing sense within certain quarters that a renewed focus on de-escalation with Iran is required, potentially complicating existing Israel-Arab partnerships.
Path Forward
Rebuilding the normalisation agenda will be a long and arduous process. A sustained ceasefire in Gaza and a renewed commitment to a two-state solution are prerequisites for restoring trust and creating a more conducive environment for normalisation. However, even with a resolution to the conflict, significant challenges remain.
Moving forward, a more nuanced and inclusive approach is needed. This involves including the Palestinian Authority in negotiations and addressing their legitimate grievances. Focusing on practical, non-political areas of cooperation – such as water security, climate change and healthcare – could help to build confidence and create tangible benefits for all parties.
The US role will be critical. A renewed diplomatic effort focused on regional de-escalation and mediated negotiations could help to bridge divides. The US can also incentivise further normalisation through security guarantees and economic assistance.
Ultimately, the success of the Abraham Accords will depend on the willingness of all parties to prioritise pragmatic cooperation over ideological differences. A phased approach, starting with restoring existing ties and gradually expanding cooperation into new areas, is the most realistic path forward. However, given the fragility of the current situation and the deep-seated mistrust, a return to the pre-October 7th level of normalisation should not be expected in the short term.
Source: Analysis based on publicly available information concerning the Abraham Accords and regional geopolitics, informed by the prompt ‘Diplomacy after the storm: rebuilding the normalisation agenda’. No single source document was provided.