Increased Allied Co-Production Signals a Redefinition of Security Partnerships.
Overview
Recent comments from Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Sustainment, Michael P. Duffey, highlight a significant recalibration of US defence procurement strategy. The focus is shifting from simply selling arms to fostering co-production with allies, alongside broader industrial base investments and sweeping acquisition reforms. This represents a move to both bolster the US munitions supply and strengthen partner nations’ self-reliance. This pivot has profound implications for regional dynamics, particularly regarding Israel, potential Gulf partners, and the evolving calculations of Iran. While Duffey’s remarks primarily centre on lessons from Ukraine and competition with China, the implications for the Middle East are considerable, signalling a potential reshaping of security relationships.
Historical Context
For decades, the US operated under a largely export-focused defence sales model in the Middle East, particularly to countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel. While these sales served US strategic interests – maintaining relationships, influencing regional policy, and supporting the domestic defence industry – they also created a degree of dependency. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the limitations of this model, notably the strain placed on the US industrial base and the logistics of sustained military support.
More recently, the war in Ukraine has dramatically underscored the vulnerabilities of relying on external suppliers for critical munitions. The depletion of Western stockpiles, partly due to aid to Ukraine, has triggered a renewed focus on domestic production capacity and finding ways to share the burden with allies. Throughout this, the US has simultaneously sought to maintain a qualitative military edge over China, requiring a substantial and sustained investment in research, development, and advanced manufacturing—all of which are central to Duffey’s statements regarding a shift in acquisition strategy.
Key Actors & Positions
* United States (Pentagon/Department of Defence): Driven by lessons from Ukraine and competition with China, the US is prioritising bolstering its defence industrial base, streamlining procurement processes, and encouraging allied co-production. Duffey’s comments articulate a move beyond traditional Foreign Military Sales (FMS) toward a model of shared manufacturing and increased partner capacity.
* Israel: Historically a major recipient of US military aid and considered a strategic partner, Israel has benefited from access to advanced US weaponry. Co-production arrangements could offer increased control over its security supply chain and leverage its indigenous defence industry, though they could also come with limitations or conditions imposed by Washington.
* Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar etc.): These nations are substantial purchasers of US arms. Co-production would offer them greater autonomy, create domestic jobs, and potentially reduce reliance on US political cycles. However, questions remain regarding the technical capacity and political willingness to fully embrace such arrangements.
* Iran: A key regional adversary to both Israel and many Gulf States, Iran monitors these developments closely. Increased indigenous defence capacity among its rivals, enabled by US co-production, will likely be viewed with concern, potentially accelerating its own weapons development programs and regional proxy networks.
Analysis
Duffey’s emphasis on allied co-production represents a fundamental shift. It acknowledges that the US cannot single-handedly meet global demand for munitions – particularly in the face of increased geopolitical tensions. By investing in allies’ industrial bases, the US aims to create a more distributed and resilient supply chain, lessening the burden on its own.
This approach has several implications. Firstly, it suggests a potential long-term recalibration in the US-Middle East security architecture. Previously, a strong element of US engagement involved providing security guarantees backed by weapons transfers. Co-production shifts the emphasis toward partners taking greater responsibility for their own defence, potentially lessening the perception of US over-commitment.
Secondly, selective co-production could be used as a strategic tool, rewarding allies aligned with US policy objectives. It may even be a pre-condition for increased security support. This could create a tiered system of partnerships, with Israel, due to its existing close relationship and technological capabilities, potentially benefiting more than others.
Thirdly, the industrial base investments Duffey describes have a dual purpose: to meet current and future demand, and to counter China’s growing dominance in key defence technologies. Whether this can be effectively achieved remains to be seen, given the complexities of the US acquisition system.
The risks associated with this shift include potential complications in maintaining technological security (protecting classified information) during co-production, and the possibility of increasing regional arms races if Iran perceives a growing imbalance in the military capabilities of its rivals.
Outlook
In the near to medium term, we can anticipate increased discussions between the US and key regional partners regarding the feasibility of co-production arrangements – focusing initially on less sensitive technologies and systems. Israel is likely to be at the forefront of these discussions, potentially expanding existing cooperative programs.
The success of this strategy hinges on the US ability to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and provide sufficient incentives to encourage private sector investment in the defence industrial base. It will also require careful diplomacy to manage the expectations of allies and avoid escalating regional tensions.
Given the ongoing geopolitical uncertainty and the potential for renewed conflict in the region, the US is likely to pursue this strategy in a pragmatic and phased approach, closely monitoring Iran’s response and adapting its approach accordingly. The Cyrus Accord, and ongoing attempts to de-escalate tensions, will be vitally important regional context as this procurement shift develops.
Sources:
Duffey, M.P. & Panter, J. (2026). A Conversation with the Pentagon’s Chief Buyer. War on the Rocks. [https://warontherocks.com/2026/08/cogs-of-war-a-conversation-with-the-pentagons-chief-buyer/](https://warontherocks.com/2026/08/cogs-of-war-a-conversation-with-the-pentagons-chief-buyer/)
