Abraham Accords: Two years after further normalisation, progress faces headwinds from wider geopolitical shifts.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020, represent a landmark shift in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Primarily facilitated by the US Trump administration, the Accords saw Israel normalise relations with four Arab nations – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan – in exchange for commitments related to security cooperation and, in Sudan’s case, a removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. These agreements deviated from decades of Arab consensus that conditioned ties with Israel on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While hailed by supporters as fostering regional stability and economic opportunity, critics argue they sidelined the Palestinian issue and potentially exacerbated tensions with Iran and its proxies. Today, the initial momentum has demonstrably slowed, with potential further expansions stalled as regional dynamics become increasingly complex. The focus has shifted from new agreements to consolidating and deepening existing ones.
Progress Made
Since the initial signings, the Abraham Accords have yielded tangible, albeit often understated, progress. Trade between Israel and the four partnering nations has significantly increased. Israel-UAE trade alone exceeded $2.5 billion in 2022, encompassing sectors like tourism, technology, and renewable energy. Bahrain has approved Israeli ambassadors and sees growing business ties, although on a smaller scale. Morocco and Israel have fostered closer security collaboration, including increased intelligence sharing and military cooperation, though a high-profile joint military exercise planned for 2023 was scaled back due to political considerations.
Crucially, defence cooperation has been a key component. The US has actively worked to integrate Israel further into regional security architectures, and the Accords have facilitated previously unthinkable joint military drills and security dialogues. Tourism has also flourished, primarily between Israel and the UAE, creating people-to-people connections usually absent in the region.
Beyond bilateral relations, trilateral dialogues – often involving the US – have become more frequent, addressing issues ranging from food security to energy infrastructure and countering Iranian influence. The I2U2 group (Israel, India, UAE, US) exemplifies this, focused on joint projects in areas like water and food security. These developments demonstrate a commitment to building on the political agreements with practical cooperation, even as larger geopolitical storms gather. However, this progress has not been uniform; Sudan’s full implementation has been hindered by internal political instability following a military coup.
Challenges
Despite the apparent benefits, significant challenges hinder further expansion and deepen existing partnerships. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a considerable obstacle. While the Accords were predicated on bypassing this issue, the lack of progress towards a two-state solution continues to fuel resentment across the Arab world and undermines the legitimacy of normalisation in the eyes of many. Escalations in violence in the West Bank and Gaza invariably create setbacks, prompting diplomatic reassessment from Arab capitals.
Furthermore, domestic political considerations within the signatory nations create friction. Public opinion in some countries remains sceptical of closer ties with Israel, limiting the scope for more overt collaboration. Economic benefits haven’t been universally felt, leading to questions about the Accords’ broad impact. Morocco’s implementation has been partially complicated by the shifting political landscape in Israel, particularly concerning Western Sahara.
Regional power dynamics also play a vital role. The war in Yemen, the ongoing instability in Syria, and the complex relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran create a volatile environment, making it harder to build trust and pursue long-term cooperation. Economic pressures like rising inflation and energy costs distract from the priorities of normalisation. The fluctuating trajectory of US engagement in the region introduces uncertainty, impacting the perceived benefits associated with aligning with Israel.
Israel-Iran Dimension
The shadow of Iran and its expansive proxy network looms large over the Abraham Accords. Iran consistently condemns the normalisation agreements, viewing them as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and a threat to its regional influence. Tehran actively works to counter the Accords through several channels. Its support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah directly challenge the security interests of Israel and its newfound Arab partners. The provision of weaponry and funding to these proxies aims to destabilise the region and deter further normalisation.
The perception – and, according to intelligence assessments, the reality – of Iran’s increasing nuclear capabilities amplifies concerns. Arab states sharing a border with, or directly threatened by, Iran view closer security cooperation with Israel as a vital deterrent, lending some impetus to the Accords. The Accords facilitate intelligence sharing and joint efforts to counter Iranian activities, including cyberattacks and support for armed groups.
However, this intensifying security dimension simultaneously increases the risk of escalation. Iran’s proxies regularly conduct attacks targeting Israeli and, increasingly, Emirati and Bahraini interests, prompting retaliatory strikes. The potential for miscalculation or unintended consequences in this volatile environment casts a shadow over long-term stability. The broader regional contest between Iran and Saudi Arabia further complicates attempts at broad-based cooperation, as nations are pressured to align with one side or the other.
Path Forward
The prospect of immediate further normalisation agreements – notably with Saudi Arabia – appears increasingly distant, though not impossible. The path forward necessitates a recalibration of expectations. Focusing on consolidating the existing agreements, rather than relentlessly pursuing new ones, is the most realistic approach. This involves deepening economic ties, expanding security cooperation, and fostering people-to-people exchanges.
Renewed efforts towards de-escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are essential, not necessarily to achieve a final status agreement, but to reduce tensions and demonstrate a commitment to inclusivity. A pause in settlement expansion and improved humanitarian conditions in Gaza could create a more conducive atmosphere for regional diplomacy.
The US role remains critical, but its engagement needs to be consistent and strategically aligned with regional realities. Washington should prioritise fostering dialogue between regional actors, including Iran, to address shared security concerns. Finding ways to mitigate Iran’s influence without resorting to unilateral escalatory measures will be crucial. Finally, acknowledging the internal political constraints within each country and tailoring approaches accordingly is paramount. The emphasis should now turn to fostering incremental, sustainable progress rather than seeking transformative breakthroughs.
Sources:
This analysis is based on publicly available information, background briefings from diplomatic sources, reports from think tanks focused on Middle Eastern affairs, and news coverage from reputable international media outlets covering the region. Specific details regarding intelligence assessments regarding Iranian proxy networks are derived from established patterns of behaviour documented over the past decade and reported by security analysts. While direct source attribution for sensitive information is not possible, the analysis reflects widely held views within diplomatic and security communities.
