Diplomatic Analysis: Moscow’s force growth in Ukraine demonstrates logistical prowess, but diminishing battlefield returns, with implications for NATO.
Overview
The Russo-Ukrainian War has witnessed a remarkable expansion of the Russian military. From a relatively small, contract-based force in 2022, Russia has grown its deployed personnel to over 700,000, and authorized a further increase to 1.5 million. This dramatic expansion, achieved primarily through contract soldiers and partial mobilization, initially promised a qualitative and quantitative advantage. However, analysis of the conflict reveals that this expansion has yielded diminishing returns on the battlefield, hampered by tactical limitations, Ukrainian adaptation, and the proliferation of drone technology. This piece examines the drivers of Russian force expansion, analyses its effectiveness, and assesses the implications for European security, particularly in light of NATO’s strategic posture.
Historical Context
Prior to 2022, the Russian military had undergone a period of modernisation, focusing on a smaller, more professional and technologically advanced force. This reflected a shift away from the mass conscript armies of the Soviet era, prioritizing rapid response capabilities for localized contingencies. The initial invasion of Ukraine exposed critical weaknesses in this model, most notably a lack of infantry and a logistical structure ill-equipped for sustained large-scale operations. The early failures prompted a desperate search for manpower, moving through phases of reliance on private military companies like Wagner, regionally-based militias, and ultimately, a partial mobilization in September 2022. This mobilization, despite domestic disruption, proved crucial in stabilising the front lines and enabling the subsequent expansion of the armed forces. The war has subsequently forced a recalibration of Russian military doctrine, returning it, albeit in a modified form, towards a mobilization-dependent force structure.
Key Actors & Positions
* Russia: Seeks to achieve its stated objectives in Ukraine – control of territory, ‘denazification’ and neutralisation – through a combination of military pressure and a ‘war of attrition.’ Expansion of the armed forces is considered essential to sustain operations, secure occupied territories, and deter further Western involvement. Simultaneously, Moscow aims to project power along its borders, particularly in response to NATO expansion, with a focus on the Baltic states and Finland.
* Ukraine: Prioritises territorial integrity and sovereignty, seeking to regain control of all occupied territories. Ukraine strategically leverages Western military aid—particularly precision-guided munitions and drones—to offset Russia’s manpower advantage and inflict high casualties. Kyiv’s position is contingent on continued international support.
* NATO: Maintains a policy of supporting Ukraine while avoiding direct military confrontation with Russia. NATO’s strategic focus is on bolstering its eastern flank, enhancing collective defense capabilities, and deterring further Russian aggression. The alliance assesses the implications of a larger, more active Russian military presence along its borders.
* Western Aid Providers (US, EU): Committed to providing Ukraine with financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. These actors aim to degrade Russia’s ability to prosecute the war and support Ukraine’s long-term security and stability.
Analysis
Russia’s force expansion demonstrates a remarkable capacity for logistical adaptation and manpower generation. However, simply increasing troop numbers has not translated into battlefield success. Factors contributing to this include: the dispersal of forces necessitated by Ukrainian drone warfare and minefields, negating the advantages of mass; the adoption of a cost-ineffective offensive doctrine focusing on attrition; and the challenges of integrating large numbers of newly mobilized or recruited personnel into cohesive fighting units.
The shift to smaller, disaggregated attacks, while reducing vulnerability to concentrated fire, has ultimately hindered the ability to achieve decisive breakthroughs. Furthermore, the prioritisation of quantity over quality has resulted in degraded combat effectiveness, as newly formed units often lack the training, equipment, and leadership necessary for complex operations.
The implications for NATO are significant. A larger Russian military, even one experiencing limitations in Ukraine, presents a heightened threat along NATO’s eastern flank – particularly in the Baltic states and Finland. The increased deployment of precision strike capabilities in these regions necessitates a reassessment of NATO’s defensive posture and a renewed focus on robust air defense, electronic warfare capabilities, and counter-drone technology. The demonstrated Russian ability to rapidly generate forces also casts doubt on assumptions regarding Russia’s capacity for large-scale conventional warfare.
Outlook
In the near term, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to sustain the rate of force expansion seen in 2023 and 2024. Recruitment rates are likely to slow, and casualty rates will continue to impact overall strength. The emphasis will likely shift towards force consolidation and refinement of existing units, with a focus on integrating lessons learned from the Ukrainian battlefield – particularly in the areas of drone warfare and electronic warfare.
However, the long-term trend points towards a larger, more mobilisation-dependent Russian military. This will necessitate a sustained investment in reserve capabilities, logistical infrastructure, and military training.
For NATO, the key will be to maintain a credible deterrent posture, enhance its collective defense capabilities, and continue to support Ukraine’s long-term security. Failure to adapt to the evolving Russian military landscape could have serious consequences for European security and stability. The focus should be on maintaining a qualitative edge, investing in next-generation technologies, and fostering greater interoperability among allied forces.
Source References:
Whisler, G., & Kofman, M. (2026). A Return to Mass: Russian Force Expansion in the War with Ukraine. War on the Rocks. [https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/a-return-to-mass-russian-force-expansion-in-the-war-with-ukraine/](https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/a-return-to-mass-russian-force-expansion-in-the-war-with-ukraine/)
