Abraham Accords: Two years on, the future of regional normalisation hangs in the balance, with Saudi Arabia as the ultimate prize.
The Abraham Accords, brokered by the Trump administration in 2020, represented a dramatic shift in Middle Eastern diplomacy. These agreements saw Israel normalise relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, in exchange for concessions – most notably, the suspension of proposed Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank and security cooperation. While Sudan’s progress has stalled following the outbreak of conflict, the UAE and Bahrain have seen a significant expansion of diplomatic, economic, and security ties with Israel. Morocco’s relationship has also deepened, though it faces internal political complexities. The core principle underpinning the Accords was the belief that establishing direct relationships could foster regional stability, offering a pathway beyond the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the Accords were criticised by some for sidelining the Palestinian issue and potentially exacerbating regional divisions. Today, the Biden administration is actively pursuing expansion, viewing Saudi Arabia’s potential normalisation as a game-changer.
Progress Made
The Biden administration, despite initial reservations about the Accords’ process, is now heavily invested in securing a normalisation agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Pressure from both allies – and concerns about growing Iranian influence – are driving this push. Recent months have seen intensive, though frequently indirect, negotiations mediated primarily by the US. The core pillars of a potential deal revolve around security guarantees for Saudi Arabia, substantial economic benefits, and, critically, a US commitment to facilitate a civilian nuclear programme for the Kingdom.
Concrete developments include direct talks between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. These discussions have focused on defining the precise security assurances Washington is willing to provide, including potential mutual defence arrangements. Simultaneously, Israeli and Saudi officials, operating through American channels, are discussing potential cooperative projects in areas such as technology, infrastructure, and energy.
Importantly, the potential inclusion of Jordan and Egypt is being explored, aiming to foster a regional security architecture. US officials actively highlight the opportunities stemming from a broader integration of Israel into the region, citing enhanced security cooperation against shared threats and increased economic investment. There’s a noticeable effort to paint the picture of a ‘new Middle East’ driven by economic partnership and security collaboration, rather than conflict. The overarching sentiment emanating from Washington is that a Saudi-Israel deal is within reach, representing a major foreign policy victory for the Biden administration, particularly heading into a US election year.
Challenges
Despite the optimism, significant obstacles remain. The most substantial is the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly insisted that any normalisation with Israel is contingent upon substantial progress towards a two-state solution. While the current Israeli government has signalled a willingness to make some concessions to the Palestinians, these have been widely viewed as insufficient by Palestinian authorities and observers. The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank continues to fuel Palestinian anger and undermine trust in the peace process.
Furthermore, the domestic political landscape in Saudi Arabia adds another layer of complexity. While Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is the driving force behind the normalisation efforts, there is internal resistance within the Saudi establishment, cautious about potentially alienating traditional allies and facing public opposition to recognising Israel without a resolution to the Palestinian issue.
A major sticking point continues to be the US support for a civilian nuclear programme for Saudi Arabia. Concerns exist within the international community – and from within the US State Department – regarding the potential for proliferation and the risks associated with expanding nuclear capabilities in the region. The specific terms of such a programme, including safeguards and oversight mechanisms, remain hotly debated. Finally, the potential resurgence of instability in Yemen and broader regional economic headwinds also pose risks to the viability of any agreement.
Israel-Iran Dimension
The push for Saudi-Israel normalisation is inextricably linked to concerns surrounding Iran’s growing regional influence. Washington, alongside Israel, views Iran as the primary destabilising force in the Middle East, citing its support for proxy groups, its nuclear ambitions, and its ballistic missile programme. The Biden administration hopes that strengthening the regional security architecture through normalisation deals will create a united front against Iran, enhancing deterrence and limiting its ability to project power.
The Abraham Accords were, in part, fuelled by shared anxieties about Iran, and a Saudi-Israel agreement would exponentially amplify that effect. A strengthened alliance between Saudi Arabia and Israel, backed by the US, could provide a powerful counterbalance to Iran’s influence in countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
However, this dynamic also carries risks. Iran is likely to view a Saudi-Israel normalisation as a direct threat to its interests, potentially leading to increased escalation and disruptive activities in the region. This could include intensifying support for its proxies, accelerating its nuclear programme, and engaging in cyberattacks. The possibility of a more assertive and destabilising Iran must be factored into any assessment of the potential benefits of normalisation. This security dimension is precisely why the pursuit of normalisation has been termed a benefit to both the US and Israel – a strategic realignment counter-balancing Iranian ambitions.
Path Forward
Realistically, a full normalisation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel before the end of 2024 appears ambitious, though not impossible. The most likely scenario involves an interim agreement, laying the groundwork for future normalization. This could involve a broader security pact including the US, Jordan and Egypt but stopping short of full diplomatic relations.
The key will be finding a formula that addresses Saudi Arabia’s security concerns, provides tangible economic benefits, and offers sufficient concessions to the Palestinians to avoid a wider backlash. A freeze on settlement expansion, coupled with modest improvements in Palestinian living conditions, could be presented as a step forward.
The US role remains crucial. Washington must continue to exert pressure on both sides to compromise and overcome obstacles. A failure to secure a deal could have significant consequences, potentially undermining US credibility in the region, emboldening Iran, and further exacerbating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even if an agreement isn’t reached immediately, the momentum generated by these negotiations could pave the way for future breakthroughs. The focus will then shift to ensuring that any agreement is sustainable, that it addresses the underlying causes of regional instability, and that it genuinely contributes to a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East.
Source: Reporting based on analysis of publicly available statements from US government officials, diplomatic sources, and regional analysts, informed by the referenced title “When Saudi goes in, everybody goes in’: Washington bets on expansion.”