Diplomatic Analysis: The rush to deliver advanced weaponry must be matched by an equal focus on rapidly training personnel for effective deployment.
Overview
Recent geopolitical events, particularly the war in Ukraine, have underscored the urgency for rapid delivery of advanced military capabilities. However, a recent analysis by Michael Woodhouse, a veteran of U.S. Army air defense and now a defence industry executive, posits that ‘speed to fielding’ – the swift provision of new weapons systems – is insufficient. True combat power hinges on ‘speed to proficiency’ – the time taken to train personnel to use those systems effectively and under realistic conditions. This insight is particularly relevant as Israel and Iran, alongside regional actors, modernise their military arsenals and increasingly rely on technologically complex systems, raising the potential for miscalculation and escalation. A failure to acknowledge the human element in military modernisation risks rendering substantial investment in hardware ineffective.
Historical Context
The emphasis on rapid technological advancement in military affairs is not new. Throughout the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union engaged in an arms race, constantly striving to surpass each other in military technology. However, early iterations of this frequently focused on quantity over quality and usability. The post-Cold War era saw efforts to integrate precision guided munitions and information technology, exemplified by the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) concept. Yet, conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that even sophisticated technology requires competent personnel, robust logistical support, and adaptable doctrines to realise its full potential. The Ukraine conflict has further illuminated these lessons, showing how drones and advanced weaponry are most effective when combined with well-trained personnel and a capacity for rapid adaptation to evolving battlefield conditions. Israel’s experiences in past conflicts, such as the 2006 Lebanon War, also highlighted the importance of integrating new technologies with established operational procedures and adequately training personnel.
Key Actors & Positions
The primary actors influencing this dynamic are governments (specifically the US, Israel, Iran, and regional allies), defence contractors, and military institutions.
* Governments: Driven by perceived security threats and geopolitical competition, governments are increasing defence spending and accelerating procurement processes – as evidenced by the US executive order in April 2025 and similar initiatives. They seek faster access to advanced capabilities.
* Defence Contractors: Companies like Leonardo DRS (where Woodhouse works) benefit from increased demand, advocating for innovative technologies and rapid production timelines. Their focus, inevitably, falls on the technological aspects.
* Military Institutions: Within these, there is a growing acknowledgement of the need for improved training and doctrine. However, institutional inertia, budgetary constraints, and the sheer pace of technological change often impede efforts to keep training – and doctrine – aligned with current capabilities. The US Army, as highlighted in the source, is experiencing a lag between fielding equipment and completing essential training elements. Israel’s military (IDF) constantly seeks to adapt to evolving regional threats and internal demand for faster integration of new technologies.
* Iran: Seeks to deter external threats by developing a diverse range of military capabilities including cruise missiles, drones, and air defence systems. Investment in these systems is coupled with an emphasis on asymmetric warfare tactics.
Analysis
Woodhouse’s central argument – that a focus solely on ‘speed to fielding’ overlooks the critical need for ‘speed to proficiency’ – is compelling. Rapidly delivering advanced weaponry without concurrently ensuring personnel are adequately trained to operate and maintain it creates a significant capability gap. This gap isn’t merely a logistical issue; it represents a strategic vulnerability. A sophisticated system with a lengthy learning curve is effectively less capable than a simpler, more intuitive system that operators can master quickly.
The core issue lies in a historical imbalance within defence acquisition processes. Hardware development receives substantial funding, clear timelines, and congressional oversight. Training, doctrine, and personnel development often receive comparatively limited attention. This discrepancy results in “fielding a box” – deploying a technologically advanced system without the necessary human infrastructure to support it.
This is especially pertinent in the context of the Middle East. Escalations can occur rapidly, leaving little time for prolonged training. Furthermore, the region’s complex geopolitical landscape demands adaptable strategies and personnel capable of independent decision-making, rather than reliance on constant external guidance. The increasing use of AI and machine-assisted systems further complicates matters, requiring operators to understand not just how to use the technology, but also when to override its recommendations. Failure to do so could lead to unintended consequences. This is true for states like Israel and Iran as they invest in drone technologies.
Outlook
The momentum behind defence acquisition reform suggests that governments will continue to prioritise speed. However, integrating Woodhouse’s argument—prioritising ‘speed to proficiency’—will require conscious policy changes. Likely developments include:
* Formalising ‘time to proficiency’ as a key performance requirement: This would compel defence contractors to design systems that are not only technologically advanced but also user-friendly and easy to learn.
* Increased investment in training infrastructure: This includes developing realistic training environments, streamlining courseware, and ensuring that training keeps pace with ongoing system upgrades.
* Enhanced integration of human factors engineering: Design processes must account for the cognitive limitations and training needs of operators from the outset.
* Greater emphasis on realistic testing scenarios: Evaluation must go beyond demonstrations to assess how operators perform under pressure and in complex environments.
A failure to address this critical imbalance will not only diminish the effectiveness of military investments but also increase the risk of miscalculation and escalation in an already volatile region.
Sources
Woodhouse, Michael. “Speed to Fielding Is Not Speed to Combat Power.” War on the Rocks, 28 September 2026, [https://warontherocks.com/2026/09/speed-to-fielding-is-not-speed-to-combat-power/](https://warontherocks.com/2026/09/speed-to-fielding-is-not-speed-to-combat-power/).
