Diplomatic Analysis: Beijing frames US-China relations as a protracted struggle geared towards achieving favourable outcomes.
This analysis examines a recently published report by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a think tank linked to China’s Ministry of State Security, regarding the state of US-China relations. Published alongside President Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing, the report details a strategic worldview fundamentally shaped by Mao Zedong’s theory of “protracted struggle”. While the summit aimed to project an atmosphere of “strategic stability,” the CICIR report portrays this stability not as a convergence of interests, but as a deliberate phase within a longer-term competitive dynamic, intended to benefit Beijing. Understanding this perspective is crucial for navigating the complexities of the bilateral relationship and avoiding misinterpretations of Chinese intentions.
Historical Context
US-China relations have evolved dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The initial period of engagement saw China’s economic rise partially facilitated by integration into the global system, largely shaped by the United States. However, this relationship became increasingly characterised by tension, particularly in the late 2010s, over trade imbalances, intellectual property theft, and China’s growing military assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Trump administration adopted more confrontational policies, leading to a trade war and increased strategic competition. This period, described by the CICIR as “Phase One” – a “strategic defensive” for China – was one of adapting to American pressure while simultaneously building its own capacity. The Biden administration continued many of these competitive policies, albeit with a greater emphasis on alliances and multilateral cooperation. The recent summit which prompted the release of the report represents an attempt to establish a more manageable, albeit competitive, framework for the relationship, but the underlying dynamics, as defined by Beijing, remain fundamentally unchanged.
Key Actors & Positions
The primary actors are the United States and the People’s Republic of China. While President Trump publicly framed the recent summit as a positive step towards “strategic stability,” the CICIR report offers a contrasting internal assessment. The US seeks to maintain its global leadership position and ensure a “level playing field” in economic relations with China, alongside managing its growing military capabilities. China, however, actively seeks to reshape the international order, challenging what it perceives as US hegemony and advancing its own interests. Within China, the CICIR, as an extension of the Ministry of State Security, directly informs the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, which is the ultimate policymaking body for foreign affairs. This means the report articulates, or feeds into, the strategic thinking at the very highest levels of the Chinese government. It is crucial to note that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often the public face of Chinese diplomacy, may present a different, more palatable message to international audiences.
Analysis
The CICIR report systematically frames the current US-China relationship within Mao Zedong’s “protracted war” theory. This theory posits three phases: “strategic defensive,” “strategic stalemate,” and “strategic counteroffensive.” The report asserts that the relationship is currently in “Phase Two,” the “strategic stalemate,” but importantly, a deepening stalemate more advanced than that experienced during the trade disputes of the late 2010s. This deepening is attributed to China’s increasing economic, scientific, and military strength, its demonstrated economic resilience against US coercion, and its ability to resist what it views as containment efforts.
This framework is significant because it suggests that China views cooperation with the US not as a goal in itself, but as a conditional outcome achieved through continued struggle on favourable terms. The “strategic stability” agreed upon at the summit is therefore not a shift in fundamental strategic direction, but a tactical pause to consolidate gains while preparing for the eventual “strategic counteroffensive.” The nuances lost in translation, highlighted by the author, reveal a worldview predicated on principled resistance, skillful manoeuvring, and the pursuit of historical initiative – terminology deeply rooted in Maoist ideology. The report’s analytical framework provides a crucial insight into the internal logic driving China’s foreign policy, revealing a long-term strategy often obscured by diplomatic rhetoric.
It’s vital to assess the risks presented by this perspective. Washington’s assumption of shared interests or a genuine desire for collaboration, if not tempered by an understanding of this underlying competition, could lead to strategic miscalculations. Furthermore, the report’s internal designation of a ‘comprehensive stalemate’ influences the operational calculus of Chinese decision making.
Outlook
Looking ahead, the “strategic stalemate” is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. While both sides have an interest in avoiding direct conflict, the underlying competitive dynamics will continue to shape the relationship. We can anticipate periods of increased cooperation on specific issues, such as climate change or AI safety, but these will likely be pursued as tactical advantages within the larger strategic framework. The lack of public reiteration of the “strategic stalemate” framing by Chinese officials suggests a deliberate attempt to manage the narrative for international consumption. However, the enduring relevance of this concept within China’s security and intelligence apparatus likely ensures its continued influence on policy decisions. Washington will need to navigate this complex landscape by maintaining robust deterrence, strengthening alliances, and developing a clear-eyed understanding of Beijing’s long-term strategic goals, as articulated not just by the public pronouncements but by the assessments produced for its own leadership.
Sources:
Garcia, Zenel. “Lost in Translation: How A Premier Chinese Think Tank Views U.S.-Chinese Competition.” War on the Rocks, 30 June 2026, [https://warontherocks.com/2026/06/lost-in-translation-how-a-premier-chinese-think-tank-views-u-s-chinese-competition/](https://warontherocks.com/2026/06/lost-in-translation-how-a-premier-chinese-think-tank-views-u-s-chinese-competition/).
