Abraham Accords: Exploring the potential, progress, and persistent hurdles to expanding the circle of peace.
The Abraham Accords, brokered in 2020 under the Trump administration, saw Israel normalise relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, followed by Sudan and Morocco. These agreements marked a significant shift in Middle Eastern diplomacy, moving beyond decades of Arab opposition to recognising the state of Israel. The core principle underlying the Accords revolves around mutual economic and security interests, along with a shared concern over Iranian regional influence. While initially hailed as a transformative moment, the momentum has slowed. The UAE and Bahrain have solidified economic ties with Israel, but the broader prospectus of regional normalisation remains complex and contested. Sudan’s progress has been hampered by internal conflict, and Morocco’s relationship, though formally intact, has seen periods of diplomatic coolness following escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The focus now turns to potential future expansions, with Indonesia consistently appearing on the shortlist.
Progress Made
Indonesia, despite not formally joining the Abraham Accords, consistently features in discussions regarding potential normalisation. This is not a novel development. Engagement has been quietly escalating for years, predating the 2020 agreements, but occurring alongside them. Although full diplomatic relations remain absent, economic links are strengthening. Trade between Israel and Indonesia, though conducted indirectly through third countries for years, is gradually becoming more transparent. Recent reports suggest a definite upwards trajectory in bilateral trade, focused on technology, agriculture and energy, carried out via complex networks involving countries like Singapore.
Crucially, Indonesian business interests have increasingly explored opportunities within Israeli markets. This isn’t simply a matter of Israeli companies targeting Indonesia; a growing number of Indonesian investors are recognising the potential within Israel’s robust tech sector and R&D capabilities. The pursuit of these economic ties is often framed by Indonesian officials as being conducted on a ‘track two’ basis: unofficial, people-to-people diplomatic engagement alongside government-led discussions.
Furthermore, there’s been a visible, if delicate, shift in public discourse. While strong pro-Palestinian sentiment exists within Indonesia – a nation with the world’s largest Muslim population – there’s a growing acknowledgment of practical benefits stemming from engagement. Indonesia has maintained its official position supporting a two-state solution, and has repeatedly stated that normalisation is contingent on progress in this area. However, the pragmatic aspects of economic cooperation are increasingly recognised even within more conservative circles. This measured approach is a key signal that, while hurdles remain, the door isn’t entirely closed. Recent high-level meetings, though downplayed by officials, point to ongoing dialogues on investment and potential collaboration in areas of mutual concern.
Challenges
Despite this incremental progress, significant obstacles hinder full normalisation between Israel and Indonesia. The most substantial impediment remains the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indonesia’s consistently stated position is that recognition of Israel is contingent upon a just and comprehensive resolution to the conflict, guaranteeing Palestinian statehood. Any significant escalation in violence or a perceived abandonment of the two-state solution would likely derail any further progress.
However, domestic political considerations within Indonesia are equally important. Public opinion remains strongly sympathetic towards the Palestinian cause, and any move towards formal normalisation would face considerable opposition from influential Islamist groups and segments of civil society. Indonesian presidents have traditionally navigated this sensitivity carefully, balancing economic pragmatism with maintaining popular support. The forthcoming presidential elections in February 2024 add another layer of complexity; candidates will likely be cautious about publicly supporting normalisation for fear of alienating voters.
Furthermore, Indonesia’s long-standing commitment to non-alignment and its role as a leader within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also act as constraints. A sudden and dramatic shift towards normalisation could be perceived as abandoning these principles and eroding Indonesia’s credibility within the wider Muslim world. Concerns also exist regarding potential backlash from other regional actors who may view Indonesian normalisation as detrimental to the Palestinian cause. There is also a strong sense of how Indonesia would be seen rather than what it does: a sense that too rapid a shift would be perceived as abandoning principles.
Israel-Iran Dimension
The shadow of Iranian influence looms large over the Abraham Accords and considerations regarding potential expansions. Iran views the Accords as a strategic threat, perceiving them as an attempt to forge a unified front against its regional ambitions. Indonesia, as a significant Muslim-majority nation and a regional power, is undoubtedly aware of this dynamic.
Iran has actively sought to cultivate closer ties with Indonesia, viewing it as a potential counterweight to the growing Israeli influence in the region. Indonesian officials have maintained a delicate balance, engaging with both Israel and Iran. The aim is to avoid being drawn into a direct confrontation while preserving its strategic autonomy.
A successful normalisation deal between Indonesia and Israel would be viewed by Iran as a significant setback, potentially prompting increased efforts to disrupt the process through diplomatic pressure or, more concerningly, through covert means. For Israel, Indonesia’s normalisation would be a vital geopolitical victory, further isolating Iran and strengthening its position within Southeast Asia. It’s understood that security cooperation, especially regarding counter-terrorism, is a quiet element of discussions between Israel and any prospective normalisation partner – Indonesia included – and a central reason for Iranian alarm.
Path Forward
Realistically, a rapid and complete normalisation of relations between Indonesia and Israel is unlikely in the immediate future. The most probable path forward involves a continuation of the existing ‘track two’ approach: fostering unofficial economic ties, promoting people-to-people exchanges, and maintaining discreet diplomatic channels.
Incremental steps, such as easing restrictions on trade and allowing limited Israeli participation in international conferences held in Indonesia, could serve as confidence-building measures. The timing of any further steps will be heavily influenced by developments in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Any substantive progress towards a two-state solution would create a more conducive environment for normalisation.
However, even without a breakthrough in the peace process, the underlying economic and strategic incentives for closer ties remain. The key will be for both Israel and Indonesia to manage expectations and navigate the complex domestic and regional constraints. The upcoming Indonesian elections will be a crucial test of political will, and the incoming administration’s stance on normalisation will be a major indicator of the future trajectory of relations. Patience and a pragmatic, phased approach appear to be the most viable course of action.
Source: Analysis based on publicly available information and expert assessments of Indonesian foreign policy and regional dynamics. This report draws on observations from diplomatic sources, economic reports analysing Indo-Israeli trade, and scholarly articles on the Abraham Accords. Specific on-the-record sources could not be used due to the sensitive nature of the discussions surrounding potential normalisation efforts.
