Abraham Accords: Assessing the Prospects for Expansion Beyond Established Ties
The Abraham Accords, brokered by the United States in 2020, represent a landmark shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. These agreements normalised relations between Israel and four Arab nations – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan – marking a departure from decades of Arab consensus rejecting formal ties with Israel in the absence of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While Sudan’s progress has stalled following a military coup, the other three nations have seen deepening economic, security, and cultural ties with Israel. The Accords were predicated on shared concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence and a desire for economic benefit, alongside a reassessment of the Palestinian issue’s centrality to regional diplomacy. The current focus is on broadening the Accords to include additional countries, with Indonesia consistently surfacing as a key, though complex, potential partner.
Progress Made: Indonesia’s Quiet Diplomacy & Emerging Opportunities
Indonesia’s relationship with Israel remains nuanced and indirect, largely due to strong domestic public opinion sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and official adherence to a long-standing policy of non-recognition of Israel. However, beneath the official stance, pragmatic considerations and evolving interests have fuelled a steady, if discreet, increase in engagement. Reports suggest backchannel discussions have been ongoing for some time, facilitated by the US and other international actors.
Crucially, Indonesia has subtly shifted its approach in recent years. While formal diplomatic relations remain absent, economic and technological cooperation has crept forward. Indonesian businesses have reportedly explored trade opportunities with Israeli counterparts through third-party nations, particularly the UAE, leveraging the existing Abraham Accords framework. There’s been growing interest in Israeli agricultural technology, water management expertise, and cybersecurity solutions – sectors where Indonesia faces significant developmental needs.
Furthermore, instances of Indonesian citizens travelling to Israel on business visas, and even attending conferences, have become more frequent, though not publicly advertised by the Indonesian government. Israeli officials have acknowledged quiet diplomatic contacts to address consular issues relating to Indonesian pilgrims visiting Jerusalem. The potent combination of Indonesian economic ambition – aiming to become a top-five global economy by 2045 – and Israel’s technological prowess continues to be a significant driver in these interactions. A key element in any potential normalisation would be establishing a mechanism to safeguard Indonesian support for the Palestinian cause, perhaps through increased economic aid and diplomatic engagement.
Challenges: Domestic Pressure, Palestinian Concerns & Regional Dynamics
Despite the momentum, substantial hurdles remain to full normalisation between Indonesia and Israel. The most prominent is fierce domestic opposition. Indonesia possesses the world’s largest Muslim population, and public sentiment overwhelmingly supports Palestinian self-determination. Any move towards recognising Israel risks triggering widespread protests and political backlash, potentially destabilising President Joko Widodo’s government, or its successor. Radical Islamic groups actively campaign against any form of cooperation with Israel.
Moreover, Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a leading voice for the Palestinian cause within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Normalisation would necessitate a delicate recalibration of its foreign policy posture and a convincing narrative to justify the shift to its regional allies, particularly Malaysia, which maintains a staunchly anti-Israel stance.
The broader regional context also plays a role. While the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco have largely navigated the initial domestic tensions following their normalisation, Indonesia’s political landscape is arguably more sensitive. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas significantly complicates the timing, making any public signal of warming relations deeply problematic. Skepticism surrounding Israel’s commitment to a two-state solution, fuelled by continuing settlement expansion, further exacerbates these concerns. Finally, the legacy of the past—including perceptions of Israeli policies towards Palestinians—cannot be dismissed, requiring careful consideration in any potential deal.
Israel-Iran Dimension: A Shared Security Calculus
For Israel, expanding the Accords to include a country of Indonesia’s size and strategic importance represents a significant victory in its efforts to build a broader regional coalition against Iranian influence. Iran views the Accords as a deliberate attempt to isolate it and undermine its regional allies. Indonesia, strategically located along vital maritime trade routes and a significant energy consumer, is a key player in the Indo-Pacific region, where Iran is actively seeking to expand its partnerships and leverage.
Israel actively promotes the narrative that a strengthened network of regional partners is essential to counter Iran’s destabilising activities – from supporting proxy groups in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen to its nuclear programme. To that end, normalisation with Indonesia, and potentially with Saudi Arabia, would send a powerful message to Tehran.
Indonesia also shares concerns about Iran’s activities, particularly regarding potential terrorist financing and the proliferation of extremist ideologies. Though it maintains relatively neutral diplomatic relations with Iran, Jakarta is acutely aware of the potential for Iranian influence to destabilise its own predominantly moderate Muslim society. Therefore, a security dimension – sharing intelligence on shared threats – would likely form a key component of any deepening relationship between Indonesia and Israel, overseen by US security guarantees.
Path Forward: Incremental Steps and Strategic Patience
Given the considerable obstacles, a swift and dramatic normalisation breakthrough between Indonesia and Israel is unlikely. A more realistic scenario involves a phased approach, focusing on expanding existing areas of discreet cooperation. This would likely begin with further facilitating business-to-business ties through the UAE and other existing Accords partners, gradually increasing visibility of these interactions.
The US will likely continue to play a pivotal mediating role, providing security assurances to Indonesia and working to address Palestinian concerns through economic aid and renewed diplomatic engagement. A crucial element will be finding a formula that allows Indonesia to maintain its public support for the Palestinian cause while simultaneously pursuing pragmatic cooperation with Israel.
Formal diplomatic relations may remain off the table for the foreseeable future, possibly linked to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or a significant shift in regional dynamics. However, a stronger, albeit still informal, working relationship offers tangible benefits for both countries, providing Indonesia with access to Israeli technology and expertise and bolstering Israel’s regional standing. Strategic patience and incremental steps—supported by continued US mediation—appear the most viable path towards greater, if not full, normalisation.
Source: Analysis based on publicly available information, including reports concerning Indonesian foreign policy, Middle Eastern geopolitics, and the Abraham Accords, combined with expert assessment of regional dynamics.
