Diplomatic Analysis: China’s expanding military strategy prioritises psychological warfare and societal incapacitation, presenting a novel threat demanding a reassessment of defence strategies.
Overview
This analysis examines a recently published concept within Chinese military circles – “all-domain megacity incapacitation warfare” – outlining a strategy for capturing Taipei not through conventional military force alone, but by collapsing Taiwan’s cognitive cohesion and ultimately, its will to fight. Rooted in the broader Chinese military doctrine of “national total war” and “cognitive domain operations”, this approach signals a significant shift towards integrating non-kinetic, psychological warfare with traditional military tactics. The framework, detailed in the internal military journal Military Art in March 2025, directly informs China’s internal debate surrounding a potential conflict over Taiwan and, crucially, has implications for how Beijing views potential confrontation with the United States. Understanding this evolving strategy is vital for both Taiwan and the US as they recalibrate their defensive postures and strategic planning in the face of a rapidly changing threat landscape.
Historical Context
China’s military thinking has evolved considerably since the end of the Cold War. Initially focused on modernising its conventional forces, Beijing increasingly recognised the importance of information warfare following observations of US military effectiveness in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War. This led to the development of the “Three Warfares” doctrine in the early 2000s – psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare – aimed at influencing perceptions and undermining an adversary’s resolve before and during conflict. General Secretary Xi Jinping further solidified this approach with his “people’s war” concept, drawing parallels to China’s mobilisation during World War II, emphasising a whole-of-society approach to national security. The COVID-19 pandemic reinforced this concept, with Chinese state media advocating for a total societal mobilisation akin to wartime conditions. The current “national total war” strategy, therefore, represents the culmination of these developments, seeking to leverage all available national resources—civilian and military— to achieve strategic objectives, with a growing emphasis on disrupting the adversary’s cognitive functions.
Key Actors & Positions
The primary actors are China, Taiwan, and the United States.
China: Views Taiwan as a renegade province and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification. The current strategy demonstrates a desire to minimise the costs of a potential invasion, prioritising the psychological collapse of Taiwan’s resistance over a protracted and destructive military campaign. China seeks to exploit vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s information systems and societal resilience.
Taiwan: Relies heavily on its own defence capabilities, supported by a US commitment to provide assistance. Taiwan is strengthening its defensive capabilities, including asymmetric warfare strategies, but faces a significant challenge in countering China’s increasingly sophisticated cognitive warfare operations. Taiwan’s ability to maintain societal cohesion and public trust remains paramount.
United States: Maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding its response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, providing support for Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities while avoiding a formal commitment to military intervention. The US position seeks to deter China while minimising the risk of escalating tensions. The US is increasingly concerned by China’s expanding military capabilities, including its focus on cognitive warfare, and is seeking to bolster its own resilience against similar attacks.
Analysis
The “all-domain megacity incapacitation warfare” concept marks a significant departure from traditional military thinking. By prioritising “cognitive attacks” – manipulating information, fabricating narratives, and exploiting societal vulnerabilities– China aims to achieve victory by breaking the will of the Taiwanese people and leadership, rather than through brute force. This approach presents several implications. Firstly, it expands the definition of legitimate military targets beyond conventional military assets to include civilian infrastructure and information systems crucial for maintaining societal function and morale. Secondly, it highlights the importance of non-military capabilities, such as cyber warfare, information operations, and propaganda, as key components of modern warfare. Thirdly, the focus on incapacitation rather than destruction implies a willingness to accept collateral damage and infrastructure disruption, potentially raising the ethical and legal concerns surrounding military operations.
The concept’s grounding in “national total war” suggests that China intends to mobilise all sectors of its society – from media and financial systems to technological infrastructure – to support a potential conflict. This underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to defence, encompassing not only military preparedness but also societal resilience, information security, and disinformation countermeasures. This, too, has ramifications for US strategy, signifying that a future conflict will take place not only in the physical domain but also within the cognitive space—a space in which the US currently has noted deficiencies, according to Chinese analysts.
Outlook
In the near term, we can expect to see continued refinement of China’s “national total war” strategy and its operational concepts. Increased investment in cognitive warfare capabilities – including AI-powered disinformation tools and cyberattack infrastructure – is likely. China will probably continue to conduct exercises and simulations focused on Taiwan, incorporating lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine war, particularly regarding information warfare and societal mobilisation.
For Taiwan, the immediate focus must be on bolstering its societal resilience, strengthening its cybersecurity defenses, and countering disinformation campaigns. The United States will likely increase its efforts to support Taiwan in these areas, while also enhancing its own capabilities to deter Chinese aggression and respond effectively to cognitive attacks. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as a testing ground for both sides, and the lessons learned will undoubtedly inform future strategies. A key indicator will be China’s incorporation of these concepts into future military exercises and policy documents. A sustained pattern of such developments will signal a growing commitment to this approach.
Sources:
Wang, Howard, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga. “Total War on Taipei: China Explores Elevating Cognitive Effects into Its Vision of Warfare.” War on the Rocks, 22 July 2026, [https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/total-war-on-taipei-china-explores-elevating-cognitive-effects-into-its-vision-of-warfare/](https://warontherocks.com/2026/07/total-war-on-taipei-china-explores-elevating-cognitive-effects-into-its-vision-of-warfare/)
