The Abraham Accords: Promise, Betrayal, and the Path Forward

How the Accords reshaped the Middle East; how they are being undermined by hypocrisy, institutions, and media; and how Saudi Arabia’s entry might decisively complete Israel’s re-entry into the family of nations, defeat Islamist isolationism, and make peace possible.

1. Executive Summary

When the Abraham Accords were announced in 2020, the world caught a glimpse of something new—Arab states openly recognising Israel in exchange for tangible gains in trade, tourism, security, and regional cooperation. This was not symbolic only. It was a pivot away from decades of treaty-less grudges, rejectionism, and grievance politics.

Since then, trade between Israel and its Accord partners has surged. For example, in 2024, trade between Israel and the UAE (excluding some government-to-government or software-only deals) exceeded US$3.2 billion, despite tensions over Gaza and intermittent calls for boycotts. The Times of Israel Israel’s trade with Arab partners overall—Morocco, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan—rose by about 12 percent, hitting nearly US$3.4 billion in value as of late 2024. Middle East Monitor

Meanwhile, Western bodies and legacy media have worked to narrow the narrative. When the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in late 2024, many Western governments reacted either with condemnation of the move or with cautious statements about jurisdiction. Rather than affirming Israel’s security needs, much of the commentary framed Israeli leadership as uniquely criminal—while ignoring atrocities by other actors.

Saudi Arabia stands on the cusp of joining the Accords. That moment would be pivotal: recognition by Riyadh, final borders opened, full diplomatic normalisation, security cooperation, and the defeat of Islamist isolationism. With Saudi inside, the family of nations would no longer treat Israel as a pariah, but as a legitimate partner.

This paper examines achievements, undermining forces, hypocrisy, the Saudi potential turning point, and offers a blueprint. It argues that unless the Accords are defended—with forces beyond idealism but realpolitik, with institutions that produce results, and with publics that benefit—the promise will be undone by envious narratives.

2. Historical Background

From 1948 through the 1990s, Arab states coalesced around a principle: no recognition of Israel without resolving the Palestinian question first. The “Three No’s” (no peace, no recognition, no negotiation) adopted by the Arab League in Khartoum after 1967 embody this orthodoxy. Peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) were rare exceptions.

The Oslo process raised hope but ultimately collapsed amid accusations on all sides. Palestinian leadership rejected offers in 2000 and 2008. International institutions rewarded rhetoric over outcome. Donors sent money. Resolutions passed. Borders stayed closed. In that environment, Israel was more isolated than insecure.

Then came 2020. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain normalised relations with Israel. Morocco, later Sudan (though more ambiguously), followed. The Accords broke decades of assumptions. For the first time, several Arab states acted in what they saw as national interest, rather than waiting for Palestinian leadership or UN resolutions to bless them.

In 2022, Israel and the UAE signed a free trade agreement. Ratified by May and entering into effect in April 2023, this deal removed or reduced tariffs on up to 96% of goods between the two countries. Wikipedia There was a prediction: this deal might push annual bilateral trade to more than US$10 billion within five years. Wikipedia

For many Arab publics, the Accords offered something concrete: energy projects, tourism, tech exchange, solar power, water desalination cooperation. Even when conflict flared (for example Gaza), trade lines with the UAE grew rather than shrank. That signaled two things: the Accords were not just symbolic; they carried durable economic incentive.

3. Achievements to Date

Trade between Israel and the UAE has shown impressive growth even amidst war. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics reported that, excluding government deals and software, trade totaled US$3.2 billion in 2024. The Times of Israel That represents a large jump, given pre-Accords trade was far lower.

Across all Abraham Accord countries (the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco), trade rose by roughly 12 percent over the past year to US$3.4 billion. Israel’s exports to Morocco rose by 53 percent; to Bahrain almost ten-fold; to Egypt around 52 percent. Middle East Monitor These are not marginal improvements. They are structural shifts.

On the security front, joint drills, intelligence sharing, and defence procurements between Israel and Gulf partners have deepened. For instance, the UAE has continued arms and tech cooperation despite crises elsewhere. These arrangements are less visible in Western media, but the governments involved treat them as existential: deterrence against Iran-backed militias, counterterrorism, cybersecurity.

Cultural, academic, and technological exchanges expanded. University partnerships, startup investment flows, tourism, and infrastructure projects (especially around logistics and trade corridors) have multiplied. The UAE and Israel made progress on a land-corridor project via Jordan and Saudi transit routes, facilitating faster trade for food, goods, and even digital infrastructure. Wikipedia

These successes prove that real peace—the kind built on shared interests—is possible.

4. Undermining Forces & Hypocrisy

Despite progress, powerful countercurrents have tried to diminish the Accords or render them conditional.

The International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, announced in November 2024, are the most glaring. They allege war crimes and crimes against humanity related to Israel’s response to the 7 October attacks and its campaign in Gaza. International Commission of Jurists The reaction from Western leaders was swift but conflicted. President Joe Biden called parts of the move “outrageous,” rejected any equivalence between Hamas and Israel, and questioned jurisdiction. AP News The UK was non-committal: respecting the ICC’s independence but ducking whether it would enforce arrest warrants if Israeli leaders travel there. Middle East Eye

At the UN, the bias is institutional. Israel remains the country most often singled out. Agenda Item 7 of the Human Rights Council uniquely targets it each session. The General Assembly issues many more condemnations of Israel than its neighbors. Resolutions against Iran or Hezbollah are far fewer, more contested, and often watered down.

Media outlets in the West often describe Accords as “transactional” peace: deal-making for money or oil, not moral progress. Western politicians, like EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her 2025 State of the Union address, suggested suspending trade preferences with Israel and critiqued “ extremist ” Israeli ministers. ReutersSuch messages provide fuel to those who would undo normalization.

Then there is moral theater around Gaza. Famine declarations, genocide accusations, and widespread media coverage intensify pressure on Israel—but similar atrocities elsewhere (Sudan, Myanmar, etc.) receive less urgency. That contrast empowers internal critics in Arab states, who say: why normalize when partners will still be black-boxed in terms of morality?

5. Saudi Arabia: The Pivotal Moment

Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords would mark a historical pivot. For decades Riyadh held a symbolic role: leader of the Islamic world, guardian of Mecca, voice of the conservative Arab order. Its fence-sitting between recognition and isolation of Israel has allowed Islamist ideology to remain potent.

If Saudi Arabia formally enters normalization, it signals several things:

• full regional legitimacy for Israel;

• collapse of the old Palestinian-first veto over Arab diplomacy;

• defeat of Islamist isolationism as the default mechanism;

• redefinition of the regional game: cooperation, trade, security over ideology;

• aligning the Sunni-Arab world with modern state interests under pressure from Iran, economic stagnation, demographic change.

The cost of waiting is rising. Saudi society is younger, more domestically focused. The government under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has invested heavily in modernization (Vision 2030) and diversification. Normalization could accelerate Saudi prospects: helping export industries, tech, infrastructure, water desalination, tourism. In return, Israel and current Accord partners must provide credible cooperation and defense guarantees.

Western actors play a role: endorsement, safeguarding Saudi investment projects, resisting narratives that Saudi normalization is betrayal. The moment Saudi steps inside, the pathway opens for others (Oman, Kuwait, others) to follow—not through rhetoric, but through demonstrable projects.

6. Regional Pressures & Risks

Iran remains the principal spoiler. Through Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and allied militias, it seeks to isolate Israel and pull Arab states back into confrontation. Each major skirmish or war in Gaza gives Iran’s narrative more traction.

Arab populist backlash is real. When Gaza is bombed, or famine declared, or Israel leaders indicted, domestic opinion in Gulf states sometimes shifts. Governments must balance between popular Arab solidarity and the strategic benefits of normalization.

The Palestinian Authority continues to challenge the Accords, condemning signatories, and seeking international bodies to delegitimise normalization. Institutional pressures inside the Arab League and via UN bodies reinforce the old order.

Turkey and Qatar, rivals of Saudi financial or ideological influence, amplify critical narratives. They host media outlets, fund NGOs, open diplomatic verve against normalization. Their broadcasting often frames Israel not as a partner but as a colonial power.

Sudan illustrates fragility. Sudan was an early Accords partner in 2020, but its internal instability, coups, and pressure from Islamist factions almost caused it to withdraw. Normalization benefits there remain fragile because institutions are weak.

7. Hypocrisy in Practice

The ICC’s warrants are a double standard when Israel is held uniquely accountable while Hamas, terrorism behind civilian shields, and years of Iranian surrogate violence receive milder censure. The judicial process demands intent, evidence, comparators. In Israel’s case, many supporters claim the ICC skipped or downplayed Hamas’ role; critics claim Israel used collective punishment. The legal arguments matter—but the selective spotlight undermines faith in impartial law.

Consider how UN agencies and Western women’s rights groups responded to sexual violence committed by Hamas on 7 October, including rape, abduction, and other atrocities. UN Women was late to issue condemnation. That delay matters: it signals whose victims first get recognition.

Meanwhile, famine declarations get thunderous headlines when Gaza is concerned but less so for Sudan or Yemen. Trade reports (Israel-UAE) thrive. Resolutions (UNGA, HRC) pile on Israel. Western politicians call for “dialogue” or “restraint” for all sides, but rarely pause to reflect on what normalization has already achieved, or how institutional betrayal weakens incentives for peace.

8. The Blueprint: Making Normalization Last

Economic Foundations
Continue accelerating trade among current Accords partners. Expand free trade agreements (FTAs) to cover agriculture, energy, digital services. Israel-UAE FTA ratified in 2022, in force from April 2023, promised tariff cuts over 96% of goods. Wikipedia Current trade ($3.2B in 2024) must grow. Israel should help invest in UAE’s export-oriented supply chains and vice versa. Moroccan and Bahraini ties need structural alignment: joint infrastructure, industrial partnerships, technology transfer.

Saudi entry must be prefaced with guarantee of joint projects: logistics corridors, ports, renewable energy. A “Gulf–Israel corridor” could connect Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade via Saudi territories. Major infrastructure investment (rail, pipelines, desalination) must accompany diplomatic recognition so that normalization is felt—jobs, goods, wealth—not just rhetoric.

Security and Strategic Cooperation
Deepen defense cooperation: Israeli and Saudi intelligence coordination against Iran’s proxies; combined missile defense; technology sharing in cyber defense. Joint military drills and contingency planning. If Saudi Arabia participates, it becomes anchor for a Sunni defense perimeter.

Institutional & Political Defence
Demand institutional reform at the UN and ICC. Agenda Item 7 must be abolished or equalled with permanent agenda items targeting others. ICC and similar bodies should require full evidentiary hearings and avoid preemptive indictments when the environment is politically charged. Western governments (US, UK, EU) must either enforce arrest warrants equally (including those against terror leaders) or refuse to treat them as verdicts.

Combating propaganda and narrative war is essential. When leaders like Ursula von der Leyen propose suspending free trade, when news outlets call Israel uniquely criminal, there must be counter-narratives built by Arab states, Israel, civil society. Media partnerships, citizen journalism, translated reporting.

Social & Cultural Solidarity
Expand cultural exchange: art, academia, sports, tourism. Student scholarships, joint university research labs. When publics see people-to-people benefits, ideology loses grip.

Protect minorities everywhere, including Israeli Arabs, Druze, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, against discrimination. Youth in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Morocco must see that normalization does not erase identity but enables opportunity.

Saudi as Turning Point Strategy
Saudi Arabia must enter normalization with conditions and guarantees. It must get assurances of security, economic payoffs, recognition. Once inside, it should act not just symbolically but operationally: signing treaties, opening embassies, facilitating regional trade corridors. That will compel other Arab states previously hesitant to join.

Western actors need to support, not sabotage. The US must publicly back Saudi recognition; EU must avoid threatening Israel with trade suspensions that alarm Saudi investors. Narratives in Europe and America must treat Saudi joining not as betrayal of Palestinians but as a realism-based peace strategy.

9. The Merlow View

Institutions seldom reform themselves. They respond to incentives. When the institutional reward is moral outrage and victimhood rather than delivered peace, rhetoric wins over reality. The Accords, as they stand, are fragile because many who dislike their success have more power in global narrative forums than those who build pipelines, solar farms, and ports.

Saudi Arabia’s entry will mark the point at which Israel is no longer a tolerated pariah but a partner. It will shift the dialectic: no longer “Are you normalizing Israel?” but “Are you refusing to?” That inversion will break Islamist isolationism, dilute UN pathological fixations, and force Western institutions to adapt.

Hope rests on pushing back against hypocrisy, refusing to let perfect be the enemy of good, and anchoring normalization in what people feel: cheaper goods, secure borders, civic interaction, not just treaties. The future will be claimed by those who act, not those who decry.

10. Call to Awareness

You can choose to watch this moment drift past or help anchor its reality. Demand from your leaders: name Saudi’s entry, commit to projects, build infrastructure, open trade. Call out double standards when Western capitals threaten trade suspensions but ignore border crossings. Support reporting that shows both crimes and cooperation. Embrace peace not as abstract ideal but as economic and security policy.

When Saudi Arabia formally signs on, that moment will define this generation’s map. Islamism, as a governing ideology of isolation, must be defeated not by bombs or bans but by trade, cooperation, normal life. The Accords can still be more than a diplomatic footnote. But only if illusions are abandoned and policies made accountable.

DATA ANNEX

1. Trade & Investment

• Israel–UAE trade:
  – 2020 (pre-Accords): ~US$200 million (mainly indirect).
  – 2022: US$2.5 billion.
  – 2024: US$3.2 billion (excluding software/government deals).
  – Forecast: US$10 billion by 2027 under FTA.

• Israel–Arab/Muslim world overall (Accords + Egypt + Jordan):
  – 2023: ~US$3.0 billion.
  – 2024: ~US$3.4 billion (+12%).
  – Export growth by country: Morocco +53%, Bahrain x10, Egypt +52%.

(Chart: Trade growth by partner country, 2020–2024.)

2. Security & Defense

• Joint Exercises: Israel, UAE, Bahrain participated in US Fifth Fleet naval drill “IMX 2022.”

• Missile Defense: Ongoing cooperation talks on integrated regional missile defense.

• Cybersecurity: UAE–Israel partnerships on AI/cyber threat detection announced 2023.

(Timeline: Major joint security exercises and agreements, 2020–2025.)

3. Tourism & Cultural Exchange

• Visitors: Over 250,000 Israelis visited UAE between 2020–2022.

• Direct flights: Dozens weekly Tel Aviv–Dubai/Abu Dhabi.

• Education: Multiple MoUs on student exchanges and research partnerships (AI, water tech).

 

(Graph: Tourism flows 2020–2024.)

4. UN & ICC Pressure

• UN General Assembly 2024:
  – 13 resolutions condemning Israel.
  – 7 resolutions on all other countries combined.

• Human Rights Council: Agenda Item 7 remains.

• ICC November 2024: Arrest warrants for Netanyahu & Gallant; simultaneous warrants for Hamas leaders, but with far less political/media weight.

(Table: UNGA resolutions by country, 2024.)

5. Saudi Arabia – The Pivot

• Statements:
  – Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (Sept 2023 interview): “Every day we get closer.”
  – US officials (2024): Security guarantees and civilian nuclear cooperation floated as incentives.

• Impact forecast:
  – If Saudi joins, normalization covers ~70% of Arab GDP.
  – Corridor projects (energy/logistics) estimated to add billions in regional trade.

(Map: Potential trade corridor via Saudi Arabia linking Israel–UAE–Red Sea–Mediterranean.)

6. Timeline of Key Milestones

• Sept 2020: Accords signed (UAE, Bahrain).

• Dec 2020: Morocco joins.

• 2021: Sudan announces intent (later delayed).

• 2022: Israel–UAE FTA signed.

• 2023: FTA enters force.

• 2024: Trade reaches $3.2B; ICC issues arrest warrants.

• 2025: Gaza famine declared; Saudi normalization talks intensify.

(Timeline graphic: Milestones 2020–2025.)